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Ch C!.pter I. 
The question of the determination o:f God's action in history is 
introduced. It represents somethinc of a problem, :for we wish 
to assert, on the one hand, that God is active in history, and 
on the other, that his action is not directly discernible in 
history. Butter:field's 'solution' to this problem is considered. 
He indicates that there are three levels of analysis in history. 
The last of these makes it possible to speak of God 's action in 
history without asserting that his action is directly discern-
ible. It is noted that Butterfield ' s third level of analysis 
is in fact a call for a philosophy of history. Butterfield's 
1;ork, it is suggested, would have been enhanced if at this 
stage he had spoken of the role of faith in determining the 
action of God. The role of faith is considered; faith does 
not acid anything t o history but supplies t he necessary principle 
of interpretation. The question of the relation beb.,een faith 
and events in history is discussed by reference to some aspects 
of the history of the concept of revelation. The understa::lding 
of' revelation in the ","ork of the 19th-century theologians, 
Barth, Bul tmaiUl, and PruUlenberg is briefly discus sed . It is 
concluded that faith is related to events in history in that i t 
is based on an understanding of the past events of history, and 
it enables us to understand that God is present in the present 
events of history. It also enables us to understand that he 
",ill be present in future events. In conclusion, it is noted 
that it is acceptable for Butterfield to assert that it is through 
our 'final interpretation of history' that ,,-e are able to see God's 
( i i) 
action in 11istory. 
Chapters II to IV describe and criticise Butter~ield's precise 
understanding o~ how God is present in history. 
Cha pter II 
The importance o~ persons as havinG a unique status among God's 
creatures is discussed. .mile this status may indicate that 
God's action is in some respects to be found in the action o~ 
men, it is noted that Butterfield's primary "ord on the subject 
is one of ,,'arning, ~or he indicates that history sho"s that all 
men are sinners . Butterfield's discussion of history and human 
nature is outlined. He notes and discusses the primacy of pe:;:'-
sons; the generality of human ,",icl<edness; and the prevalence 
of the sin of' self- riGhteousness in history. It is argued that 
this indicates that Butterfield understands God to be at ""ork in 
history holding human cupidity in check, and ,,'orking through 
the po"er of his love. It is suegested that, "hi Ie Butterfield's 
discussion is a good one, it does not go far enough . By con-
sidering some aspects of the New Testament teaching (the Pauline 
conception of the 'ne" man', and his teaching on S"",,-, ocrv'V~) 
and Niebuhr's discussion of 'the paradox of grace', it is· indi-
cated that Butterfield i enores a whole theatre of God's action 
in history, namely, his "ork in creating a 'ne1>' humanity'. 
Chapter III 
It is suggested that a 1Il0ral deity ,>'Culd not call a morally 
neutral order of creation into existence. It is noted that But-
(i i i) 
ter£ie ld d i scusses th~ 1!lattcr o£ l:l or&J.ity in llistory £ronl two 
anales. Firstly, he di s cus ses the c111estion of 1Il0ral judgements 
in hi s tory. He indicates that they exist; that they exist be-
c a use 0:(' the def'ccts in hUlllan nature; and that, ,.,hile judaement 
is al1',ays upon people, the s ent ence f'alls upon the schematised 
pat terns into ,;,hich human lif'e ranaes itself. He i n dicates that 
t h e s e judgements are the judcelnents of God. It is noted that 
the assertion that moral judgements indicate the action of God 
is problematic because, if it is not carefully discussed and 
limited, it may indicate that God's action is arbitrary. It is 
noted, h01>'ever, that the possibility of this arbitrariness is 
avoided if moral judgements are seen to operate as a la" in his-
tory. It is further noted that, because Butterfield is forced 
to qualify his understanding of God's action through moral j u dge-
ments (by stating that the judgements are to be understood as 
self-judgements, and that ,mora l judgements are alien to the realm 
of scientific history), the notion of' moral judgements in history 
is only of limited value in determining the action of God in his -
tory . Secondly, Butterfield discusses the problem of suffering. 
He states that the Suffering Servant concept indicates that some 
forms of suffering are to be seen as vicarious suffering. The 
chapter is concluded by comparing Butterfield's conclusions re-
garding suffering "ith those of John Hick. This comparison in-
dicates that the idea that God i s active in the creative outcome 
of cataclysm and tragic conflict is also only of limited use in 
determining the action of God, for not all suffering leads to a 
heightening of personality. 
(iv) 
Chanter IV 
The chapt e r i.ndicates that the idea of providence in history 
is given adequate treatnlcnt if it is asserted tllat God is active 
in history, and tl13.t he is not the only cenuine actor. It is 
indicated that Butterfield recognises the n e ed for both of 
these requ~re nlents. He gives the first one ad~~late attention, 
especially in his discussion of how history g oes on over our 
heads. Although he indicates that he does not see God as the 
only actor in history, he takes this too far for he fails to 
bive sufficient attention to the understanding that God is at 
"ork guiding the course of history. He fai ls here because he 
does not treat providence eschatologically. In order to sho" 
that it is necessary to treat providence eschatologically, the 
development of the doctrine of providence in recent years is 
outlined. Schleiermacher, Ritsehl, dialectical theology, Nie-
buhr and Gilkey are all mentioned in this outline. It is Sh01,'Tl. 
that Butterfield's position is clearl y against the liberal 
theologians and that, like I'Iiebuhr's understandinG, it has some 
affinities with dialectical theology. Finally, it is argued that 
Gilkey's understanding ,.,hereby providence is understood eschato-
lOGically is a more accurate one than that of Butterfie'ld; It 
is stated that God must be ul"lderstood to be bringing history to 
a cUlmination. 
Chapter V 
This chapter sets out the h,'o conclusions of the thesis. The 
first i.s that God's acts are discernible only by the eye of 
faith. It is sho~n that this understanding is to be found in 
(v) 
Butterf'ield's ,,,ork. It is also arCHe d that this understandine 
is true to the },ew Testament vie". T1·:0 objections to this con-
clusion are considered: The first is that of' PaJlnenberc , ... ho 
states that history ouCht to inf'lncnce theoloGY. It is sho,m 
that this is not true, not even of Pal111enberG's 01>'11. the ology. 
The second objection is that this makes the ,·:hole matter of 
understanding God's action too subjective, but it is shoWTl that 
this approach is as objective as that of history itself. 'up to 
this point the conclusions are in agreement "ith Butterfield's 
understandinG', but it is argued that his method, and thus his 
understanding require development. The second conclusion is 
that in attempting to discover God r 5 action in history, 1'le must 
begin with a theological inquiry before proceeding to a histori-
cal one. It is sho,m that Butteri'ield do es in f'act beGin "ith 
theology rather than history. Finally it is argued that, because 
Butterfield's "ork illustrates that he "ould have had a far bet-
ter and deeper understanding of God's action in history had he 
started ,,·i th a r;lUch more thorough theological inquiry, our theo-
logical inquiry must be as thorough as possible. It is indica-
ted that Gilkey, ',ho set out on this path , does not go far 
enouGh. Thus, Butterfield's ,;ork provides a valuable starting 
point, and point s the way for"ard, for a full understanding of 
God's action in history. 
CHAPTER I 
THE DETER~lINATION OF GOD'S ACTION IN HISTORY 
Either God is present in history or he is not. Christians 
believe that he is. l A.A. Hoekema states this belief in clear 
and concise terms: "God is working out his plan in history. 
Individuals may rebel against God and try to frustrate his plan. 
Others will try to do his will and 'live for the advancement of 
his kingdom. 2 In either case God remains in control. II This 
view, which is the usual Christian understanding of history,J 
is not shared by all ~odern thinkers,4 and nor is it a typical 
ancient belief,5 but it is a necessary belief for Jews and 
Christians who understand history to be primarily a history of 
salvation. 6 This understanding of God's presence in the world 
is the primary contribution of the Heilsgeschichte school to the 
fund of theological knowledge. As Alan Richardson puts it: liThe 
1. 
2. 
J. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
In his fifth discourse on religion Schleiermacher asserted 
that history as a totality is God's revelation, and so did 
Schelling. Hegel believed universal history to be an indirect 
revelation of God. (W. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 
16f.) The Heilsgeschichte school and the process theologians 
are among many who today hold the view that God is present 
in history. 
A.A. Hoekema, The Bible and the Future, p.25. 
This conclusion is not held today in quite the same way as it 
was before the revolution in historical thinking, but it is 
nevertheless asserted that our life and history is in God's 
hands. Cf. W. Pannenberg, Faith and Reality, chap.l and A. 
Richardson, The Bible in the Age of Science, chap.2. 
For example, it is not shared by Burkhardt since he does not 
believe that a historian may deal with "ultimate ends". (K. 
L1>with, Meaning in History, p.20ff.) 
For example, Lowith argues that the ancient Greeks did not 
attempt to discover the ultimate meaning of the world, but 
concentrated their attention on the cosmic law of growth and 
decay. (L6with. Ope cit., p.4) 
See K. L6with, ibid., p.5. 
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factuality of God's action in the events to "'hich the Bible 
testifies is the central affirmation of the Heilsgeschichte 
school, but it is not a new emphasis which that school has made 
for the first time in the twentieth century; it is the historic 
Christian faith ... 7 It is important to note that Heilsgeschichte 
is not simply concerned with the events recorded in the Bible, 
but may also be broadened to include the present events of 
history.S There is therefore a substantial amount of support 
within the theological world for people like Hoekema who say:9 
" ••• 'sacred history' is indeed revelatory of God and 
his purposes. Since, however, 'sacred history' is 
the key to the· m~aning of all history (because it is 
at the center of God's dealings with man), and since 
all of history is under God's control a nd direction, 
we may say that all of history is a revelation of 
God. This is not to say that history is always 
crystal-clear in its message. Truth is often on the 
scaffold, and wrong is oft en on the throne. 1{bile 
historical events are happening, it is often quite 
difficult, if not impossible, to discern what God is 
saying to us through them •••• Nevertheless, it must 
be maintained that history -particularly red emptive 
history- reveals God and his purposes." 
But, as soon as we say "all of history is under God's control", 
we beg the questions: Ho,,.? and How do you know? In other words, 
we raise the question of the determination of God's action in 
history. The determination of God's action in history is the 
crucial question for any theological understanding of history, 
7. A. Richardson, op. cit., p.14l. 
8. 1{hile not all scholars may agree that Heilsgeschichte may be 
used this way, Peter John Olivi understood history itself to 
be Heilsgeschichte (R.Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, 
p.162) And today, Pannenberg speaks of the broadening of Heils-
geschichte into a universal history. (W. Pannenberg, Revel-
ation as History, p.l]]) 
9. A.A. Hoekema, op. cit., p.26. 
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for God's action is not directly discernible in history. If we 
assert that God is active in history, or that history is moving 
towards a divinely ordained goal, wnhout at the same time, att-
empting to say how or where God is active, our assertion will 
resemble mere superstition. 
But it is not easy to say how or where God is active in history. 
The reason for this is that God cannot be recognised directly. 
Alan Richardson gives the conclusion of this line of reasoning: 
.. ,,10 
"No human science can investigate God or his action 1n h1story. 
But this does not mean that the question of the determination of 
God's action in history must be set aside, for, as Karl L6with 
says, "It is the privilege of theology and philosophy, as con-
trasted with the sciences, to ask questions that cannot be ans-
11 
wered on the basis of empirical knowledge". 
Kierkegaard's explanation of our inability to discover the action 
of God in a direct way (that is, in contrast to a belief that his 
action may be discovered through intermediate agencies) is an 
important one. Kierkegaard believed that "direct recognizable-
ness is . "12 pagan1sm He arrived at this conclusion because his 
whole outlook was governed by the notion that God is 'other,.lJ 
The result is that in Kierkegaard's understanding "God is not to 
10. Alan Richardson, An Introduction to the Theology of the New 
Testament, p.ll. 
11. K. L6with, op. cit., p.J. We may add that in some respects 
this is not true only of philosophy and theology but also of 
history. The objectivity of history is discussed in chapter }. 
12. Cit. ap., Colin Bro~n, History, Criticism & Faith, p.151. 
13. See Brown, ibid., p.149. 
be identi:fied with anything in history even when he is present. 
For since God is other, he remains incognito.,,14 Having intro-
duced the subject of this thesis in the form o:f a problem, we 
may now proceed directly to Herbert Butterfield's 'solution'. 
Butterfield is convinced that God is active in history. The 
thought of a God who is outside life and history is quickly dis-
missed: 15 
"Of all the factors which have operated to the disad-
vantage of religion and the undermining of religious 
sense in recent centuries, the most drunaging has been 
the notion of an- absentee God who might be supposed 
to have created the universe in the first place, but 
who is then assumed to have left it to run as a piece 
of clockwork, so that he is outside our lives, outside 
history itself, unable to affect the course of things 
and hidden a,,,ay from us by an impenatrable screen." 
God is not absent, he is present. He is "working at every mom-
16 
ent, visible in every event". Butterfield's explanation of 
how God is visible in every event is of critical importance for 
the subject of this thesis. He explains that there are three 
ways of looking at the events of history and nature. Each way is 
valid and all three are true at the same time. He also refers 
to these three 'ways' as three different levels, or three differ-
ent kinds of analysis. He argues that on the first level -of 
analysis men's actions make history. He calls this the bio-
graphical ",ay of looking at events, for the important point at 
this level is that we have to do with men acting "with a certain 
amount of freedom so that they can be held responsible for the 
14. 
15. 
16. 
Ibid., p.152. 
H. Butterfield, "God in History", in C.T. 
God, Histor!, and Historians, p. 193. 
Ibid., p.19 • 
NcIntire (ed.), 
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decisions they make.,,17 On the second level he finds that 
history represents a realm of law. At this level, which he 
calls the historical way of looking at events, the events of 
history "are in a certain sense reducible to laws" for "however 
unpredictable history may be before it has happened it is cap-
18 
able of rational explanation once it has happened." Butter-
fi eld maintains that in a sense history, at this level, goes on 
over Men's heads, for here we have to deal with, for example, 
deep forces and tendencies such as those "'hich led to the 1914 
1918 war; "deep forces and tendencies which were working in fact 
for generations to help make the t1"entieth century an era of 
colossal warfare. ,,19 At the third level of analysis we find the 
Providence of God. Butterfield argues that we should not pic-
ture God as interfering with nature or history but rather as the 
one who in his Providence continues the original work of creat-
ion and continually maintains the world. He argues that this 
view is one of two views that can be held about life or about 
history. The other is that everything must be traced back to 
pure chance. He is convinced, h01"ever, that one or other of the 
views must be held, for while scientific laws can explain why 
events occur, they cannot explain the conjuncture of events, and 
it is the conjuncture of events that is important in history. It 
is by means of this third level of analysis that we may speak of 
God's action in history. Butterfield mentions that "in a sense" 
this level includes the other t1vO levels. 20 The following pass-
17. Ibid., p.199. 
18. Ibid., p.195. 
19. Ibid., p.199. 
20. Ibid., p.196. 
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age indicates how the third level may include the others, as 
well as the danger of treating them in cOllnection with the first: 
"We may believe in some form of providence that guides 
the destiny of men and we may if we like read this into 
our history; but what our history brings to us is not 
proof of providence but rather the realisation of how 
mysterious are its ways ••• Our assumptions do not matt-
er if we are conscious that they are assumptions, but 
the most fallacious thing in the world is to organise 
our historical kn01,ledge upon an assumption without 
realising what we are doing, and then to make inferen-
ces from that orga~isation and claim that these are the 
voice of history." 
It is because of his understanding of the third way of looking 
at history that he is able to speak quite directly of God's 
action in history. F 1 h ·t 22 or examp e, e wrl es: 
"The Providence of God is at work in the downfall of 
Nazism, in the judgements that come on the British 
Empire for its own sins, in the present prosperity 
of the United States, and in our own individual daily 
experiences. That is what we see with the higher and 
more royal parts of our minds, when we make our high-
est judgements about life - our real valuations about 
events. And that is "hat we ought to say when we have 
our national joys , or our national victories or our 
national problems or our national dangers. We have to 
say: Providence has put us in this predicament - what 
can it mean? what moral good can we get out of it? 
what does God intend us to do when he puts this prob-
lem before us? what sins did we commit as a nation to 
merit this response from God and from history? 
Butterfield believes that when we ask these kinds of questions 
we are adopting the biblical interpretation of history.' He 
points out that the "fate and vicissitudes" of the Old Testam-
ent people "were uncommonly like those of most other states -
even modern ones"23 but where they differed was in seeing God 
as the God of history and in interpreting their history in the 
21. H.Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, p.23. 
22. H. Butterfield, "God in History", in C.T. NcIntire (ed.) 
God, History, and Historians, p.197. 
23. Ibid., p.201. 
7 
light of that fact. 
As we have just seen, it is by means of this distinction of 
levels in history that Butterfield is able to speak about God's 
action in history. He does not pretend that the action of God 
can be seen in what he calls 'scientific history'. Scientific 
history is the study of history undertaken by the historians. 
It is a study that ought to produce the same results for all 
scholars irrespective of the political or theological views that 
they may hold. Butterfield believes that it is in this sense 
that it is scientific; it has to do with those things which are 
equally true for a Christian or an Athiest. 24 At this level, 
talk of the action of God would be out of place, for, says 
Butterfield: 25 
"Historians,limited by the kind of apparatus they 
use and the concrete evidence on which they must 
rely, restrict their realm to ,,,hat we might almost 
call the mechanism of historical processes: the 
tangible factors involved in an episode, the dis-
placements produced in human affairs by an observed 
event or a specific influence, even the kind of 
movements that can be recorded in statistics." 
Because of this restriction, historians are not able to develop 
26 
a self-explanatory system. This in turn means that our relat-
ionship to the "human drama ••• is a matter not of scholarship, 
24. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.16-24. Butter-
field's certainty of the objectivity of 'scientific history' 
is not shared by scholars such as Gillcey who, as we shall see 
in the last chapter, stresses the role of the historian's 
presuppositions in even determining 'facts'. Though, what 
Butterfield says here must be balanced with his assertion: 
"We go to the past to discover not facts only significances". 
(In The Whig Interpretation of History, p.9J.) 
25. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.19. 
26. Ibid., p.22. 
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but of religion.,,27 Thus for Butterfield, our "final inter-
pretation of history,,28 cannot be settled by those engaged upon 
the task of scientific history. This interpretation has to do 
with our understanding of the third level in history. His 
understanding of the difference between interpretation (the 
third level) and historical study is indicated in the follO"l..ing 
passage, ,,,here, speaking of the middle ages, he says: 29 
"(The) belief that God or the stars were responsible 
for an outbreak of plague did not necessarily forbid 
all study of natural processes that might be invol-
ved; any more than the belief that God chastises a 
nation with war need stop a historical study of the 
intermediate human agencies which might have provoked 
a given conflict." 
In Christianity and History, where Butterfield does not mention 
the three ways of looking at history, he mru~es the following 
statement: 30 
"Those ,.ho believe that God is in history, and those 
who say that there is no God in history can hardly 
help offering what are really concealed arguments in 
a circle whenever they talk about the subject." 
We may take this to be his understanding of what happens when 
one attempts to discuss the contents appropriate to the third 
way of looking at history, in connection with either of the 
first two levels. 
Does Butterfield's three-fold way of looking at the events of 
history and nature solve the problem of the determination of 
God's action in history that we raised earlier in the chapter? 
We said that the problem is that God's action is not directly 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid., p.25. 
29. H. Butterfield, The Statecraft of Machiavelli, p.63. 
30. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.128. 
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discernible in history because human science cannot investigate 
God or his action. It seems that Butterfield does provide a 
solution to this problem for, while believing that "'hen we adopt 
the biblical interpretation of history we are able to see the 
action of God in history, he does not expect us to see God 
directly, and nor does he expect scientific history to discern 
God's action. His writings make it absolutely clear that he 
does not understand God's action to be directly discernible in 
history. Two illustrations of this will suffice. First, in 
Christianity and History31 he records being completely baffled 
by a candidate for a viva voce examination in Oxford who "ascri-
bed everything to the direct interposition of the Almighty and 
therefore felt himself excused from the discussion of any 
intermediate agencie s." And second, Butterfield spells out his 
own view in some detail in "God in History":32 
"Of course it is possible to read history and study 
the course of centuries without seeing God in the 
story at all; just as it is possible for men to live 
their lives in the present day without seeing that God 
has any part to play. I could not go to people and say 
that if they studied nearly t,,,o thousand years of Euro-
pean history this would be bound to make them Christian; 
I could not say that such a stretch of history would 
prove to any impartial person that Providence underlies 
the whole human drama." 
If God is only seen through intermediate agencies, how do we 
discern God's action in history? Butterfield's answer is that 
that depends on our interpretation of history. The reason for 
this is clear. If God's action is not directly discernible in 
31. Ibid., p.20. 
32. H. Butterfield, "God in History", in C.T. McIntire (ed.), 
God, History, and Historians, p.200 
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history we cannot turn to scientiIic history to discover that 
action. As ButterIield puts it: 33 
"When we seek to know how God is revealed in history 
we do not make a chart or diagram 01 all the centuries 
and try to show what the Iuture great world-empires are 
tending or to what end great human organizations are 
moving." 
On the positive side he says:3 4 
"II we wish to know how God worl<s in history we shall 
not Iind it by looking at the charts 01 all the cent-
uries - we have to begin by seeing how God works in 
our individual lives and then we expand this on to the 
scale 01 the nation, we project it on to the scale 01 
mankind. Only those who have brought God home to them-
selves in this way will be able to see him at work in 
history, and without this we might be tempted to see 
history as a tale told by an idiot, a product 01 blind 
Chance." 
When ButterIield talks about "the Iulness 01 our commentary on 
the drama 01 human liIe in time,,35 he makes it clear that his-
tory alone cannot provide this Iulness. The Iulness, which 
Iills the story with power and signiIicance, is to be Iound 
in a combination 01 history and religion. . t t 36 He po~n s ou 
that this combination is Iound in a Christian interpretation 01 
history, in the Narxian system, or even in H.G. \VeIls' History 
01 the World. What ButterIield is saying here is that scientiI-
ic history is not sufficient Ior determining the meaning of the 
human drama, but that a philosophy of history is also necessary. 
In addition to this, he argues that each person has to choose 
his own philosophy of history in order to make sense 01 what 
happens. He "WTites: 37 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid., p.20l. 
35. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.23. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid., p.25. 
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"Our final interpretation of history is the most 
sovereign decision we can take, and it is clear that 
everyone of us, as standing alone in the universe, 
has to take it for himself. It is our decision about 
religion, about our total attitude to things, and 
about the 1,ay we will appropriate life. And it is in-
separable from our decision about the r~le we are go-
ing to play ourselves in that very drama of history." 
Our discussion above leads us to conclude that Butterfield's 
third level of analysis is merely a call for an appropriate 
philosophy of history. He tends to reduce the possibilities to 
two: 38 either one believes in Providence, or one believes in 
Chance. He, of course, chooses to believe that God is at work 
in history. Butterfield's work would have been enhanced if at 
this point he had discussed the role of faith in determining 
God's action. It is by speaking of faith that most writers are 
able to discuss God's presence in history. For example, in his 
discussion of the biblical view of history, Karl Lowith says:39 
"The Christian understanding of history and time is not a 
matter of theoretical demonstration but a concern of faith ••• " 
But, while Butterfield does not speak directly of faith, he 
seems to assume the role of faith in the believer • . His three-
fold schema therefore has the advantage of allowing the role of 
faith to play its essential part in the determination of God's 
action. The role of faith is not that it adds something new to 
what exists. It is rather a new way of interpreting what is 
40 
us. already before It is this interpretative aspect of faith 
that enables us to 'see' the action of God in history. The 
38. H. Butterfield, "God in History", in C.T. McIntire (ed.) 
God, History, and Historians, p.200. 
39. K. Lowith, op. cit., p.186. 
40. See C. Br01m., op. cit., p.195. 
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words St Aueustine was fond of using are appropriate in this 
41 
connection: nisi credideritus, non intelligtis. The quotat-
ion of these words at this stage of our discussion could be seen 
as what someone (I think it was Tillich) once described as the 
tendency to fill an intellectual gap with devotional material. 
But it is not. In the first · place, it is an attempt to make 
sense of Richardson's accurate observation that even in the un-
likely event of a Christian and a non-Christian historian being 
in substantial agreement concernine the facts of biblical history, 
they ,muld differ so widely in their interpretation of the facts, 
that they would arrive at quite dissimilar conclusions when they 
came to write their respective histories. 42 Their interpretation 
would, of course, differ because they do not share the same 
faith. Secondly, we may, from our discussion above, agree with 
Kierkegaard that belief in the understanding that the eternal 
43 is revealed in history is a paradox. We may also agree with 
him that "faith is the acceptance of paradox in all its absur-
44 
dity" for the use of paradox is merely an attempt to talk about 
God in such a way that we avoid the over-literalness which leads 
. 45 to an attitude of ldolatry. In the third place, faith may be 
seen as a principle of interpretation, and it is common sense 
that every interpretation of history, whether Christian or not, 
must have a principle of interpretation. Reinhold Niebuhr has 
pointed out that the various principles of interpretation current 
41. Cit. ap., Richardson, An Introduction to the Theology of the 
New Testament, p.19. 
42. A. Richardson, Christian Apologetics, p.92. 
43. See A. Richardson, The Bible in an Age of Science, p.51. 
44. Ibid., p.52. 
45. See John Macquarrie, God-Talk, p.228. 
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in modern culture, which claim to be the result of' a scientif'ic 
analysis of' the course of' events, are all principles of' inter-
pretation introduced by f'aith~46 
Now, however, we must put an important question. How is f'aith 
related to events in history? That is, does f'aith only depend 
on religious consciousness, or is it also somehow based on 
historical events? In ans.,er to this question, we may briefly 
consider some aspects of' the history of' the concept of' revelat-
ion. It is appropriate that we begin our survey with 19th-
century theology. Karl Barth, whose O.ffi contribution to the 
debate about the nature of' revelation is an extremely important 
has this to say of' 19th-century theology:47 one, 
"Nindf'ul of' its origins in Herder and the Romanticists, 
19th-century theology has given ne,,, emphasis and recog-
nition to the essentially historical nature of' the 
Christian f'aith which sets Christianity apart f'rom 
other religions. This is the merit and achievement of' 
this theology. Christian f'aith is shaped by its relat-
ionship to the history which f'inds its central meaning 
in the name of' Jesus Christ." 
Barth points out that the spokesmen of' 19th-century theology saw 
the Christian f'aith as a series of' historical phenomena, and that 
Jesus had theref'ore to be apprehended historically according to 
the historical-critical method prevailing at that time. 48 The 
19th-century theologians had to "approach the person and the lif'e 
of' Jesus on the basis of' the New Testament record, but they also 
had to distinguish His own religion f'rom that of' His witnesses 
and their environment.,,49 This led to the so-called 'quest f'or 
the historical Jesus'. The results of' this development have 
46. See Richardson, Christian Apologetics, p.99. 
47. K. Barth, The Humanity of' God, p.27. 
48. Ibid., p.28. 
49. Ibid. 
been described50 as :first leading to the liberal Jesus "who 
enunciated nineteenth century platitudes about the Fatherhood 
o:f God and the Brotherhood 0:fMan",51 then to A Schweitzer and 
the 'consistent eschatology' school, and finally, to the Form-
critics' view that the theology of the New Testament Church 
stands between us and a reliable knowledge of the li:fe and 
teaching of the Jesus o:f history. In Alan Richardson's view,52 
the combined impact of Barth and Bultmann led to the virtual 
abandonment by scholars of the Liberal quest :for the historical 
Jesus. 
Bultmann set about demythologizing the Bible. He explained that 
to demythologize the passages of the Bible which "bear the stamp 
of mythological expressions" does not mean that they are elim-
inated but that they are made understandable to modern thought. 53 
The implications of his programme for our understanding of rev-
elation and history are seen, for example, in his treatment of 
the resurrection. His conclusion is that: "The resur:cection 
itself is not an event of past history. All that historical 
criticism can establish is the fact that the :first disciples 
came to believe in the resurrection. 1l54 On the positiv"e side 
he says: " ••• the resurrection is an article of faith because it 
is far more than the resuscitation of a corpse - it is the 
50. By Alan Richardson, The Bible in the Age of Science, p.123. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Ibid., p.125. 
53. Rudolf Bultmann, in E.J. Tinsley (ed.), Modern Theology 2 
Rudolf Bultmann, p.64. 
54. Ibid., p.77. 
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eschatological event."55 How do we arrive at this ~aith? 
Bultmann answers: "Christ meets us in the preaching as the one 
crucified and nowhere else."5 6 
Barth also divorces revelation from history in this sort of 
"Way. His basic reason ~or severing the links between revel-
ation and history on the one hand, and revelation and ~aith (the 
link that existed for the 19th-century theologians) on the other, 
is that there is an infinite qualitative distinction between God 
and man57 so that God can only be known through God. God is 
hidden even in his revelation, and is thus kno1= only through 
his Word. The Word of God has a threefold form, namely, Jesus 
Christ, the revealed Word of God; Scripture, the written Word of 
God; and the proclaimed Word of God. In speaking of Barth's 
doctrine of the Word of God, Colin Brown concludes: " .•• Barth 
preserved the otherness of God and the dynamic character of 
revelation, while at the same time showing that revelation has 
an objective, knowable content."58 
However, in recent years scholars like Wolfhart Pannenberg 
have attempted to restore the link between revelation and history. 
Pannenberg argues that the self-revelation of God is indirect and 
is thus brought about by means of the historical acts of God. 59 
This revelation is not comprehended completely in the beginning, 
55. Ibid., p.75. 
56. Ibid., p.76. 
57. See William Nicholls, Systematic and Philosophical Theology, 
p. 94. 
58. C. Brown, op. cit., p.188. 
59. In Revelation as History, p.125ff. 
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but at the end of revealing history. This placing of revelation 
at the close of history is grounded in the indirectness of 
revelation. Further, the historical revelation has a universal 
character. The universal revelation of God is realized in Jesus 
of Nazereth insofar as the end of all events is anticipated in 
his fate. Pannenberg's discussion of the universal character 
of historical revelation is important for our present discussion. 
He argues against any understanding that puts revelation in 
contrast to, or conflict with, 60 'natural knowledge'. As far 
as he is concerned, the historical revelation is open to anyone 
who has eyes to see. This means that faith is not the basis 
for finding the revelation of God in the history of Israel and 
of Jesus Christ. 61 Rather, the knowledge of God's revelation in 
the history demonstrating his deity is the basis of faith. 62 
Pannenberg acknowledges that 
so-called brute facts"63 but 
"history is not composed of raw or 
that the events of history are under-
standable only in the context of the traditions and expectations 
in which they occur. For this reason, he retains the concept of 
the Word of God saying: "The Word relates itself to revelation 
64 
as foretelling, forthtelling and report." 
How then is faith related to events in history? It is related 
in two ways. On the one hand, it is based on the events of 
past history, namely the revelatory events of the history of 
60. Ibid., p.135. 
61. Ibid., p.137. 
62. Ibid., p.138. 
63. Ibid., p.152. 
64. Ibid. 
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Israel and of Jesus Christ. However, in the last chapter we 
shall see how the understanding that God was at work in these 
past events is itself based on faith. It was by faith that the 
people of the time were able to discern the action of God, and 
it is by faith, or, more correctly, it is by our interpretation 
based on faith that we are able to acknowledge that God was at 
work in the events to which the Bible attests. And on the other 
hand, faith is related to events in history in that our faith 
enables us to understand that God is present in the current 
events of history, and that he will be present in the future 
events of history. This assurance of the present and future 
acts of God has its basis in the knowledge given us through the 
Word of GOd. 65 We will need to return to this discussion in the 
last chapter, but now we may simply note that it is perfectly 
acceptable for Butterfield to assert that it is through our 
'final interpretation of history' (though we would prefer 
'through faith, believing that faith is the appropriate prin-
ciple of interpretation for a Christian) that we are able to 
see God's action in history. 
lYe have seen, then, that Butterfield, while acknowledging that 
to speak about God in history is simply to present "concealed 
arguments in a circle", allows this very type of conversation 
by alluding to a higher level of analysis of what happens in 
history. His analysis leads him to conclude: " ••• I think that 
65. Here I use 'Ward of God' meaning primarily proclamation 
understood as the announcement and interpretation of God's 
acts in special revelation. 
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the general course of history is so shaped that a Christian is 
in the right relation with it. n66 In the subsequent chapters 
we shall examine his views that lead to this conclusion, for they 
spell out his precise understanding of how God is active in 
history. 
66. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.l)O. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORY AND HUJlIAN NATURE 
The Christian faith is generally understood to emphasise the 
importance of persons as having a unique status a mong God's 
creatures. Nan is the greatest of all God's cre atures in that 
he, and he alone, is created in the image of God. The biblical 
conception of the "image of God" has been understood in various 
ways during the centuries. The earlier views were more optimis-
tic than the later ones, mainly because of the influence of the 
scientific revolution. Ian Barbour underst a nds the seventeenth 
century to have been a century in which a crucial and rapid 
1 
change in outlook took place, and in which man's "changing 
status was traced from 'The Center of the Cosmic Drama' to 'The 
Demoted Spectator' and 'The Rational mind,."2 By "The Cent e r of 
the Cosmic Drama" he has in mind the early views in ,,'hich man was 
understood to be radically different from all other creatures, 
while by "The Demoted Spectator" he me ans that, as a result of 
Galileo's evidence supporting the Cop e rnican theory, "man was 
demoted from the center of the universe to a spinning. per-
ipheral planet",) with the resultant endange ring of the notion of 
man's uniqueness and the idea of God's particular concern for h im. 
Barbour identifies the third stage during this period as one in 
'"hich man's reason is understood to guarantee his unique status 
in creation. 4 His discussion of the changing status of man 
during, and since, the seventeenth century does not discount the 
1. Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, p.15. 
2. Ibid., p.54. 
3. Ibid., p.)). 
4. Ibid., p.4). 
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notion of man's unique position in creation, for he concludes 
by pointing out that biologists now understand man's distinct-
iveness to lie in his rational powers, his capacity for symbol-
ic communication, his freedom of choice, and his cultural evol-
t . 5 U J..on. Just as Barbour indicates that the distinctiveness of 
man is demonstrated by the natural sciences, so Reinhold 
Niebuhr does from the perspective of Christian thought. He 
indicates that: 6 
" ••• the Biblical conception of 'image of God' has 
influenced Christian thought, particularly since 
Augustine (when not under a too strong Platonic or 
Aristotelian influence), to interpret human nature 
in terms which include his rational faculties but 
"hich suggests something beyond them." 
By speaking of something beyond rational faculties he has in 
mind "the idea of 'transcendence', namely that man is something 
which reaches beyond itself - that he is more than a rational 
creature.,,7 Han is self determining "in the sense that he trans-
cends himself in such a "ay that he must choose his total end".8 
He must find his "true norm" in the character of God but without 
aspiring to be God. 9 
Thus man has a unique status among God's creatures. The words of 
the psalmist express this belief as an act of praise; " ••• You 
made him inferior only to yourself; you crowned him "ith glory 
10 
and honour". Given this view of the nature and importance of 
man, it is perhaps to be expected that we should assume that 
5. Ibid., p.ll). 
6. R. Niehuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Han, Vol.I, p.161. 
7. Ibid., p.162. 
8. Ibid., p.163. 
9. Ibid. 
10.Psalm 8:5 (GNB) 
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God's action is in some respects to be ~ound in the actions of 
men. But Butterfield's primary word on this subject is one of 
Like Reiwlold Niebuhr,ll Butterfield warns that the warning. 
sinfulness of human nature should be trucen seriously. His warn-
ing is expressed in strong words: "It ·is essential not to have 
faith in human nature. 
disastrous one.,,12 
Such faith is a recent heresy and a very · 
In arriving at this view Butterfield hints 
at his understanding of God's action in history. Here we will 
trace his argument by focusing on key sentences from his chapter 
on the subject in Christianity and History. 
But first, we must notice the boundary of his discussion of 
human nature in history. His is not a theological discussion of 
human nature. Rather, he is concerned to state, and discuss, 
the insights which the study of history throws on this subject. 
His conclusion, which leads to his warning noted above, is that 
""hat history does is ••• to uncover man's universal sin. ,,13 He 
believes that once this is stated the historian c·annot justifi-
14 
ably say anymore about human nature. For example, the histor-
ian may not proceed to decide whi ch people are better or worse 
than others "in the eyes of eternity n. 1 5 The reson for this is 
that conditioning circumstances playa great role in determining 
. 16 
the actions of human belngs. He says: "I can condemn myself 
after self-examination, but in the case of others I can never 
11. R. Niebuhr op.cit., p.178ff. 
12. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.47. 
13. Ibid., p.45. 
14. Ibid., p.43. 
15. Ibid., p.45. See also International Conflict in the Twen-
tieth Century, p.26ff. 
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know what allowance has to be made f'or conditions ••• "17 
The f'irst sentence that we wish to consider is: "Personalities 
are the croW11ing blossom of creation. ,,18 This is the starting 
point of' Butt e rfield's discussion of human nature in history. 
He notes that history deals with the human story "as the affair 
of individual personalities,,19 and that because of this, history 
cannot discuss historical events without reference to the motives 
and feelings of the people involved. 20 History therefore 
envisages "a world of human relations", one which stands over 
against nature. 21 Butterfield states that our respect for 
personality has groW11 with the growth of civilisation. 22 In-
sofar as the determination of God's action in history is con-
cerned, we cannot overestimate the importance of the concep-
tion of respect for personality. Later in this chapter we 
will consider whether Butterfield pays sufficient attention 
to this matter, but at this point we need simply to note the 
importance of persons and their growth, and the fact that 
Butterf'ield links this "ith the goal of history: " ••• the end 
of human history is the manufacture and education of human 
souls. History is the business of making personalities. n2) 
Before we can say how this is done, we must recognise a basic 
f'act regarding human nature, and this is the next step of 
Butterfield's argument. 
17. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.4S. 
18. Ibid., p.28. 
19. Ibid., p.26. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid., p.28. 
22. Ibid., p.29. 
2). Ibid., p.76. 
2) 
This step of his argument has three inter-related stages. The 
first is drawn together by his statement: "I accept Acton's 
t l Ot f 0 k " 24 thesis in regard to he genera 1 y 0 human W1C edness. He 
believes that history endorses the biblical view that all men 
are sinners. This is illustrated by what he believes to be a 
significant fact which is discovered by the study of history, 
25 
namely: 
"The plain truth is that if you were to remove cer-
tain subtle safeguards in society many men who had 
been respectable all their lives would be trans-
formed by the discovery of the things which it was 
now possible to do with impunity; weak men would 
apparently take to crime who had previously been 
kept on the rails by a certain balance existing 
in society; and you can produce a certain condition 
of affairs in which people go plundering and steal-
ing though hitherto throughout their lives it had 
never occurred to them even to want to steal. A 
great and prolonged police strike, the existence 
of a revolutionary situation in a capital city, 
and the exhilaration of conquest in an enemy coun-
try are likely to show up a seamy side of human 
nature amongst people who, cushioned and guided by 
the influences of normal social life, have hitherto 
presented a respectable figure to the world." 
The existence of these safeguards, rather than human nature 
which remains the same in each case, determines the difference 
bet"een civilisation and barbarism. 26 The majority of people 
. are neither criminals nor saints27 and Butterfield believes 
that their conduct is largely dependant on the existence or 
absence of the safeguards to which he refers above. He iden-
tifies the fact that human conduct is so subject to conditions 
28 
as an aspect of the Fall. 
24. Ibid., p.)O. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Ibid., p.)l. 
27. H. Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, p.46. 
28. Ibid. 
24 
The second stage of his argument underlines the extent of the 
human wickedness mentioned in the first. He states: "We regard 
the element of cupidity ••• as being universal in the sense that 
all are touched with it".29 The opposite view is that only 
some people, "only a few very bad people",30 as Butterfield 
puts it, are to blame for the imperfections in the drama of 
human life. Butterfield rejects this view as being out of line 
with the evidence of historical study. For instance; in the 
case of the industrial revolution, history shows that it was 
"a general process in society, the result of no man's plan, 
but rather the total effect of all men's cupidity, all men 
playing their little parts as they try to better themselves 
or to escape the difficulties created by tlleir competitors ••• ,,3l 
In further support of this view Butterfield mentions Thomas 
Carlyle's belief that every man in France "as responsible for 
the horrors of the French Revolution. 32 Therefore, history 
demonstrates that it is possible that a civilisation may be 
destroyed "without any spectacular crimes or criminals but by 
constant petty breaches of faith and minor complicities on the 
part of men generally considered very nice people".33 Butter-
field describes the effect of all this as "a gravitational-
pull in history itself" 34 which "draws the highest things 
dO'IDwards, mixes them with earth, and taints them with human 
cupidity.n 35 
29. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.36. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid., p.37. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid., p.38. 
35. Ibid., p.39. 
25 
The third stage of his argument identifies the sin '''hich "ob-
servable historical happenings" show to be the primary one. 36 
He writes: "In the kind of world that I see in history there 
is one sin that locks people up in all their other sins, ••• 
namely the sin of self-righteousness".37 The way in "'hich this 
sin is shown up in history is that allo,,,ance is not made by 
people for the sins "'hich they themselves ",ould commit if they 
. 38 
were in the other person's place. The effect of this is that 
in a conflict "each side feels that its own severities are not 
vicious at all, but simply punitive acts and laudable measures 
of judgement. 1139 The sin of self- righteousness, "'hich is also 
illustrated by the lack of "the tolerances and urbanities and 
self-discipline "'hich we associate with a civilized ",orld",40 
is identified by Butterfield as a consequence of a phenomenon 
"'hich he calls "modern barbarism l1 • 41 The result of the evil 
of modern barbarism is "contempt for the other man's person-
ality, the belief that the enemy 'deserves' killing".42 Butter-
field sees the suffering of the thousands of innocent people 
at Hiroshima as an example of this.43 
Now, if history sho",s that the major learning about human nature 
is that all men have sinned, ",here is God's action to be found? 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
Ibid., p.40. 
Ibid. (See also, for example, International Conflict in the 
T1>'entieth Century, p.98.) 
H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.42. 
Ibid., p.43. 
Ibid., p.49. 
H. Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, p.48. (And 
many other places. E.g. Christianity and History, p.31.) 
Ibid., p.50. 
Ibid. 
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Butterfield's discussion of human nature in history indicates 
that God is to be found at work in the forces which hold human 
cupidity in check. He says: 44 
t1 •• • Providence produc e s a v,,"orld in which men can 
live and gradually improve their external condit-
ions, in spite of sin - in other words it does the 
best that human beings have left possible for it 
at any time". 
This means two things. Firstly, that the very existence of 
the forces which hold human cupidity in check is to be attrib-
uted to God. In Butterfield's view these forces are the social 
institutions. His point is that the ordering of society, 
through the social institutions which are the gift of 
controls and curbs human sinfulness. He puts it like 
"By organising our cupidities society tames them, 
exacts its toll from them, curbs them and even 
conceals a considerable part of their operation; 
though it is alvays possible to desire better 
adjustments in the social system, so that checks 
on self-aggrandisement may be tightened in one 
way or ano ther. " 
God, 
this:45 
His illustrations of these controls and curbs include, on the 
one hand, a thing as basic as the rule of the road, and, on 
the other, such institutions as government, property, and even 
46 
slavery. It is important to notice ho,,,ever that he does not 
identify God's action too closely with these institutio·ns · (as 
the quotation above with its reference to the possible desire 
for better adjustments in the social system indicates). He 
points out that the Christian tradition has regarded these 
institutions as either necessary evils or, and he favours this 
44. H. Butterfield, Christianity ruld History, p.J4. 
45. Ibid., p.J5. 
46. Ibid., p.J4. 
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second view, as a second-best gift from God. Q7 
Secondly, God holds human 
of his love. Butterfield 
cupidity in check through 
puts it like this: 48 
the power 
"Here is the last safety-valve that Providence offers 
within human history itself, when the forces of evil 
seem to have sealed up the outlet to any other hope. 
When power is at its most implacable and self-right-
eousness is at its stiffest there is an extreme point 
where only Love can still fight and it can only fight 
with the weapons of non-resistance." 
This love is seen at work in the lives of Christians provided 
they remain faithful to God. 49 Because the object of God's 
love is human personalities, it actually brings a heightening 
of personali~y.50 This happens through the witness and action 
of Christians in that their view is that all men should be jud-
-1 
ged to be sinners but treated as born for eternity.~ Regar-
ding themselves, Christians acknowledge that they share man's 
universal sinfulness and therefore confess themselves to be 
sinners. 52 Because they have this understanding, Butterfield 
believes that Christians have a safety-valve against the kinds 
of hardness of heart that are characteristic of modern barbar-
ism. 53 He warns though that, while "the role of Christianity 
in history has been most impressive when it has fol101,erl this 
patternn ,54 nthe corruption of the best becomes worse than any-
thing else n55 as is the case when Christianity reverts to 
47. Ibid. 
48. H. Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p.53. 
49. Ibid., p.53. 
50. Ibid., p.50. 
51. Ibid., p.55. 
52. Ibid., p.56. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Ibid., p.54. 
55. Ibid., p.61. 
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legalism or Pharisaism. An example that Butterfield gives in 
more than one place of God's love as expressed in Christian 
teaching, holding human cupidity in check is that of the con-
flict between the '¥higs and the Tories after 1688. 56 : He points 
out that it was seen as a conflict of Right versus Wrong '''hich 
could have gone on indefinitely as the severities of the party 
in the ascendant were prompted by moral indignation, but these 
severities provoked in turn the desire for reprisal in the 
other party when the situation was reversed. The cycle was 
broken by William III who, after the revolution of 1688, in-
sisted on "what we might almost call forgiveness of sins.,,57 
Butterfield concludes: 58 
"England is indeed the hapiest of all the illustra-
tions of the fact' that civilisation itself requires 
the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins. And the 
pattern of this doctrine reproduces itself in in-
credible manifoldness in the very cells that go to 
make the fabric of an urbane and tolerant world." 
Having outlined Butterfield's discussion of human nature in 
history, and having considered the implications of this for 
an understanding of God's action in history, we must now ask 
if his treatment of the subject is adequate. By briefl"y dis-
cussing some aspects of the New Testament understanding of 
human nature, the argument below will indicate that Butterfield-
's discussion of human nature in history falls short of a full 
understanding of God's action in history. But before proceeding 
56. Ibid., p.59f. and Christianity, Diplomacy, and War, p.51. 
57. Ibid., p.60. 
58. Christianity, Diplomacy, and War, p.51. 
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to these a s p ects of the bibl i cal und e r st a n ding of h uman nature 
we n e ed to justify this step in the a r gwnent. This must be done 
in order to do justice to Butterfield's position, for it was 
pointed out above that his discussion of human nature is not 
a theological one but merely an attempt to identify and di s cuss 
the insights which the stu dy of history throws on the subject. 
Our criticism is that insofar as Butterfield's "ork indicates 
the action of God, this is a weakness. By confining his dis-
cussion largely to those things which may be seen by the 'tech-
nical historian' (as Butterfield would put it) he has plac e d 
severe limitations upon his unde rstanding of hwnan nature. He 
needs to go beyond 'technical history', as he is prepared to 
do els1ihere. For instance, he ackno1<ledges that if one wants 
a full "commentary of the dra ma of hwnan li:fe" one must go be-
yond the technical historian,59 and, as the p a ssage quoted 
below indicates, he acknowledg e s that any talk o:f God's action 
in history depends on one's interpretation of history:60 
"I am unable to see how a man c a n find the hand of 
God in secular history, unless he has first found 
that he has an assurance of it in his personal ex-
perience. If it is objected that God is revealed 
in history through Christ, I cannot think that this 
can be true for the mere external observer, who puts 
on the thinking-cap of the ordinary historical 
student. It only becomes effective for those who 
have carried the narrative to intimate regi ons in-
side themselves, where certain of the issue s are 
brought home to human b e ings. In this sense our in-
terpr etation of the human drama throughout the ages 
rests finally upon our interpretation of our most 
private experience of life, and stands as merely an 
extension to it." 
Therefore Butterfield's talk of God holding human cupidity in 
59. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, see p.19ff. 
60. Ibid., p.I07. 
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check is an interpretation of what happens. "Technical his-
tory" can do no more than possibly suggest that human cupidity 
is held in check. And, when we acknowledge the need for a 
Christian interpretation of history, we must surely acknowledge 
that the Bible is one of the primary sources for such an inter-
pretation. In explanation we may point to Butterfield's belief 
that the key to understanding God's action in history is one's 
personal experience and, in this connection, note Niebuhr's 
observation that "all common human experience requires more 
than the immediate experience to define the character of the 
object of the experience. n6l And, as Niebuhr points out, "If 
the reality touched is something more than a mere 'obj ect' 
but is itself subject, that is, if its character cannot be 
fully revealed to us, except as it takes the initiative , the 
principle of interpretation must be something more than merely 
the general principles of knowledge which illumine a particular 
experience. 
ation'. "62 
The principle of interpretation must be a 'revel-
While we cannot simply equate the Bible with the 
1 t o ~ G d 6) °t ° th ° ° d 64 d ~ G d' reve a lon OL 0, 1 lS e lnsplre recor OL 0 S rev-
elation of himself, and, therefore, its insights into human 
nature need to be considered. 
61. R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Han, Vol.l, p.129. 
62. Ibid. 
6). Cf. J. Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought, 
Chap. 6. 
64. There isn't the space, and nor is it a necessary part of this 
discussion, to discuss the meaning of 'inspiration', but I 
agree with Baillie that, while "the witness itself is a human 
activity and as such infallible", the Holy Spirit must have 
assisted the writers "to convey the message of salvation to 
those whom their "ords would reach." Ibid., p.lll. 
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Our concern here is not with everything that the New Testament 
has to say about human nature but simply with those aspects of 
the picture which Butterfield neglects. While Butterfield 
concentrates on the Old Testament insights, particularly those 
of the prophets, and on some of the New Testament ones, such as 
the teaching that all men have sinned, he neglects the teaching 
of the change which takes place when a man is ' .in Christ'. The 
whole of the Pauline conception of the 'new man ' is neglected, 
as is his teaching on dtKOfIOcrUIJ? A key passage apropos the 
' new man' concept is II Corinthians 5:17 : "Therefore, if any 
one is in Christ, he is a new creation, the old has passed 
away, behold, the new has come." (RSV) C.K. Barrett prefers 
"there is a new act of creation,,65 to the translation "he is a 
new creation", but this does not alter the understanding that 
believers are part of the new creation of God which is radically 
different to the old creation. Hoekema describes the implicat-
ion of this 66 verse: 
"Since believers now belong to Christ's new creation, 
we are to see ourselves as new creatures in Christ, 
not just as depraved sinners. To be sure, apart from 
Christ we are sinners, but we are no longer apart 
from Christ. In Christ we are now justified sinners, 
sinners who have the Holy Spirit dwelling within, 
sinners ,,'ho are progressively renewed. Our way of -
looking at ourselves must not deny this newness but 
af:firm it." 
Alan Richardson makes a similar pOint: 67 
"Though in their baptism this putting on of the new 
humanity has taken place eschatologically, Christ-
ians still need exhorting to be what (eschatologi-
65. C.K. Barrett, II Epistle to the Corinthians, p.173. 
66. A.A. Hoekema, The Christian Looks at Himself, p.55. 
67. A. Richardson, An Introduction to the Theology of the New 
Testament, p.242. 
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cally or by faith) they already are: 'Put away ••• 
the old man, which waxeth corrupt ••• be ye renewed 
in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, 
which after God has been created in righteousness 
and holiness of truth.'" 
Richardson's observation that the conception of the 'new man' 
is to be understood eschatologically is shared by Barrett who 
believes that the concept 'in Christ' is to be u n derstood esch-
atologically.68 This kind of connection beb{een present and 
future that we have seen in the two quotations above is found in 
Paul' s treatment of dll<'O<I "C-tl'I~, particularly where 
treated as the 'Objects of Hope,.69 The article on 
in Kittel puts it l~k~ this: 70 
];-':O<10<7t1))7 is 
dtt<A<'locrv"'7 
"The present salvation carries "ith it a future sal-
vation. For justification is a grace ,-,hich implies 
the dawn of the ne" aeon and thus bridges time. 
Hence in the light of the VUV L l'L , "hich has the 
content of fulfilment, all that happens prior to 
the end has an interim character. This is the great 
inversion entailed in justifying faith. In Judaism 
justification is uncertain and must wait until the 
day of judgement. Here it is already present and 
active. It is declared in the light of history and 
grasped by faith as a present reality. But since 
the promise of d / KP< 10<7'(1\)'1 transc ends time, and 
points to the consummation, it gives rise to hope, 
and at this vital point faith in justification 
overcomes the hesitation of Je"ish eschatology." 
It is also important to notice that Paul understands dtXo({Oo-VV7 
to be the po"er of the ne" life. 71 dO<C<IOCTtlY7 in the life' 
of the believer has a teleological purpose, for it leads to 
(Romans 5:21) And, "this righteousness as the 
68. C.K. Barrett, op . cit., p.173 and Romans, p.127. 
69. See G. Kittel (ed.) Th e ological Dictionary of the New 
Tes,tament, Vol. II, p.207f. 
70. Ibid. 
71. See ibid. p.209f. 
72. Ibid. p.209. 
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power . 'hich engaees the ,,,hole life is "'hat overcomes ;l'Lf<tcl. 
The p a ragraph above indicates that there is an area of God's 
action in history, namely his creation of a new' humanity, which 
Butterfield ignores. This may be illustrated further by ref-
erence to what Niebuhr calls "the paradox of grace".74 He 
describes the paradox in the~e terms: 75 
"Every facet of the Christian revelation, whether 
of the relation of God to history, or of the relat-
ion of man to the eternal, points to the impossib-
ility of man fulfilling the true meaning of his life 
and reveals sin to be primarily derived from his ab-
ortive efforts to do so. The Christian gospel never-
thele ss enters the world with the proclamation that 
in Christ both ',dsdom' and 'power' are available to 
man; which is to say that not only has the true 
meaning of life been disclosed but also that resources 
have been made available to fulfill that meaning." 
In support of the second assertion he refers to I Corinthians 
4:19 "The Kingdom of God is not in ",ord but in po",er". Put 
another way, the paradox of grace is that grace is, on the one 
hand, the power of God over man, while on the other, it is the 
power of God in man. 76 Both facets of the paradox are fully 
expressed in Pauline doctrine 77 without contradiction for Paul 
distinguishes, argues Niebuhr,78 between a life governe-d by the 
principle of self-centredness and one governed by the principle 
of devotion and obedience to God, and even in his injunctions to 
the sinless to sin no more, Paul indicates that he understands 
7J. Ibid. 
74. See R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol.II, p.98 
to 212. 
75. Ibid., p.98. 
76. Ibid., p.99. 
77. Ibid., p.100. 
78. Ibid., p.102. 
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the possibility of sinnin~ for those ',ho have broken "'i th sin 
in principle. But if sin is broken in principle, is it true 
that it is never broken in fact in the new life of which Paul 
speaks? Niebw,r's ru,swer to this problem is of critical impor-
tance for our present discussion. He says:79 
liThe real question is no·t whether we are able to 
achieve absolute perfection in history; for even 
the most consistent perfectionist sects do not 
deny that human life remains 1n process. The 
question is whether in the development of the new 
life some contradiction bet\,een human self-will 
and the divine purpose remains. The issue is 
"hether the basic character of human history, as 
i:t -is- apprehended in the Christian faith, is over-
come in the lives of those who have thus appre-
hended it." 
And he indicates that the question can be ans\>'ered in t\w ,,'ays, 
either in terms of logic or in terms of experience. He maintains 
that it is logical to assume that once one has become a\>'are of 
the character of one's self-love and of its incompatibility,dth 
the divine "ill this a1>'areness should break the p01>'er of sin in 
one's life. 80 "Furthermore", he says, "this logic is at least 
partially validated by experience. Repentance does initiate 
a ne'lv life." On the other hand, the experience of the Christian 
Church refutes those "'ho follow this logic ",ithout qualification. 
In other words, we are dealing here ,,-i th a genuine para-dox. 
NieblliLr traces the development of the one side of this paradox 
in the emphasis on sanctification in Catholicism and the Renais-
sance understanding of the pow-er of human capacities, and the 
development of the other side in the Reformation recognition of 
the persistence of sin in the life of the redeemed. His under-
79. Ibid., p.12l. 
80. Ibid., p.122. 
~ 
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standing is close to that of Butterfield when he attempts a 
synthesis of the Reformation, Renaissance and Catholic views 
and argues that the primary contribution of the Reformation to 
this synthesis is its refutation of any pretentions of fulfil-
ling life and history either by grace or by natural capacities 
inhering in human nature or in the historical process. 81 But, 
whereas Niebuhr recognises both sides of the paradox of grace, 
Butterfield seems to see just one. 
Though it is possible that Butterfield hints at the creation 
82 
of a new humanity iri ~ome places, we are suggesting that it 
needs a much fuller treatment if it is to approximate an ad-
equate discussion of God's action in history.83 It is, of 
course, extremely difficult to illustrate the power of God in 
man, though accounts such as the conversion of Zacchaeus, and 
especially its effect ("I give half my possessions to charity; 
and if I have cheated anyone I am ready to repay him four times 
84 
over"), must surely count as evidence. Butterfield would 
point out here that the historian's "apparatus and science" do 
not enable him to pronounce an "absolute judgement of value" on 
incidents such as this one. 85 This brings us back to tbe _ 
essential point that the second side of the paradox of grace 
81. Ibid., p.211. 
82. E.g. possibly in what he says about the operation of love 
creating a heightening of personality (History and Human 
Relations, p.50.) though it is not at all clear that Butter-
f~eld would see this as an example of God's creation of a 
new humanity. 
83. Again, in fairness to Butterfield, it must be pointed out 
that he never discusses the question of the 'determination 
of God's action in history' as such though it is treated by 
implication. 
84. Luke 19:8 NEB 
85. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.27. 
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is known only by 1aith. We have already noted Dutter1ield's 
reticience to speak 01 :faith in determining God's action in 
history, so we may conclude by simply asserting that it is no 
more absurd (logically or phenominologically) to maintain that 
God is at "'ork in history creating a new humanity than it is 
to assert, as Butter:field does, that there is a constant battle 
between good and evil, and that "in reality the essential 
strategies in the war o:f 
the intimate interior o:f 
86. Ibid., p.9l. 
good against evil 
l .t. .86 persona 1. l.es. 
are conducted within 
CHAPTER III 
HISTORY AND }!ORALITY 
"It is impossible to conceive .of a moral deity "'ho has called 
a morally neutral order of creation into existence. III If this 
assertion is correct, and if it is possible to detect moral 
principles operating in history, then this is an area in ',hich 
the action of God is to be determined. Butterfield indicates 
that he believes that it is possible to detect moral principles 
in history, and he considers the matter of morality from two 
angles. First, he discusses the notion of moral judgements in 
history, and, second, he considers the challenge of the exis -
tence of adversity, suffering and catastrophic events to the 
belief that morality may be connected "'ith history. 
Butterfield begins his discussion of moral judgements in history 
on a positive . note by stating emphatically that there are moral 
judgements that lie in the very nature of history.2 An example 
of such a judgement is the "ay in which the story of Napoleon 
shows that "inordinate pride and ungovernable po"er are brought 
in the course of time to their appointed doom." ) But the most 
important example that he gives, one which he calls "a -specimen 
case of the operation of the moral factor in historyn,4 is that 
of the judgement passed on the excessive militarism of prussia. 5 
The moral factor in history is illustrated in that judgement en-
sued because the militarism was excessive and it went unchecked. 
1. E.W. Ives, God in History, p.58. 
2. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.49. 
3. Ibid., p. 48 • 
4. Ibid., p.50. 
5. Ibid., p.48f. 
38 
History does not illustrate that there i s an inevitable judge-
ment on all conquerors - some deal with the effects of their 
violence in such a way that the evil they have done is turned 
into later good and they thereby escape judgement. 6 The example 
also indicates that the moral judgements in history can be long-
term affairs,7 for in this case the judgement was delayed by 
the "prudence and virtue" of Frederick the Great, and by Bismark 
8 
who "called a halt to a career of conquest". Butterfield con-
c1udes: 9 
"And how happy might Germany not have been today -
how many errors might she not have saved herself -
if even in 1918 she could have at least have taken 
the verdict as the judgement of God and set out to 
discover ,,'hat it "as that she had done to offend 
heaven. tt 
Butterfield did not, of course, originate the idea of moral 
judgements in history,lO and his vie,,' that they exist is shared 
11 by many scholars. One reason for this is, as we shall see 
presently, that it arises out of the Biblical (especially the 
prophetic) understanding of Godts action in history. But it is 
not necessary to import this Biblical understanding into the 
arena of historical enquiry for it is possible to argue for the 
existence of moral judgements from the evidence available to 
the historian. For example, E.W. Ives argues that it is an 
6. Ibid., p.50. 
7. Ibid., p.49. 
8. Ibid., p.49. 
9. Ibid., p.50. 
10. He says that the notion of judgements is older than Christia-
nity (Christianity and History, p.57.) 
11. E.g. E.W. Ives, Reinhold Niebuhr, Langdon Gilkey, David Jen-
kins, E.H. Harbisin. 
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historical truism to state that a society has to bear th"con-
f 't t' 12 sequences 0 1 5 own ac lons. And, as he sees it, to believe 
that judgement operates in history is simply an acceptance of 
the :fact that human a:f:fairs are the consequences of human ac-
tions. 13 To believe, therefore, that judgement operates in 
history is "to stand on the nature of history itself".14 Judge-
lllents merely represent "the evident conclusions and probabilities 
of history".l.5 
It is important that we understand the basic reason for the exis-
tence of the moral judgements in history. Butterfield's essen-
tial point is that they exist because of the defects in human 
nature. This means at least two things. First, that ,,,here judge-
ment occurs, that is, where disaster occurs, the occasion ought 
to be recognised as one for If t " 16 se -ques ~on~ng. And second, that 
although it may not be experienced as such at the time, judge-
ment may be a good thing. For example, Butterfield records some 
of the changes that have occured in the ordering of society (such 
as the Greek city-state, the Roman Empire, the medieval idea of 
the Church's relation to the state, etc.) and concludes: 17 
" . . . 
the river of time is littered with the 
ruins of these various systems, and we can 
hardly understand "hy those who lived under 
them should have even wished them to go on 
forever or valued them so much." 
12. E.W. Ives, God in History, p.79 
13. Ibid., p.80. 
14. Ibid. 
1.5. Ibid., p.79. 
16. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p • .53. 
17. Ibid., p • .5.5. 
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And, it is no doubt because the question of' judc;e ment has to do 
with the sinf'ulness of' human n ature, that Butt e rf'ield believes 
that judge ment f'alls heaviest on those who "ape providence". 
H ·t 18 e ,IT]. es: 
"Judgement in history f'alls heaviest on those 
"'ho come to think themselves gods, who f'ly in 
the f'ace of' Providence and history, who put 
their trust in man-made systems and worship the 
,,rork of their own hands, and who say the strength 
of their 0'= right arm gave them victory." 
But, while the judgement is always upon people, or, more specifi-
cally, upon man's universal sin, the sentence f'alls on the sys-
tem as a whole and noi; simply upon individuals. 19 The systems 
mentioned here are the nations, Civilizations, institutions and 
"the schematised patterns into which human lif'e rang e s itself 
in various periods". 20 These systems are the things ,.hich col-
lapse under judgement for, as he puts it, "in the course of time 
it is human nature which finds out the holes in the structure, 
21 
and turns a good thing into an abuse." 
It is clear from the above that Butterfield und e rstands history 
to be concerned, as least in some respects, with morality. But, 
as the present chapter seeks to show, this assertion is a prob-
lematic one. Insofar as moral judgements in history are con-
cerned, one of the problems of asserting that they are indica-
tive of the presence of a moral factor in history is that God's 
action could a ppear to be arbitary for it is not always appa-
rent that judgement is meted out. Ives indicates that he believes 
18. Ibid. , p.60. 
19. Ibid. , p .• 55 and 64. 
20. Ibid. , p.64. 
21. Ibid. , p.55. 
that we should assume that "the principle tmt wrong is punished 
22 
is generally operative, not occasionally invoked." His con-
cern is that the insights gained through the debate between 
science and theology, namely, that God does not upset normal 
procedures by arbitary behaviour, should be carried into our 
understanding of God's involvement in human affairs . 23 He does 
not believe that this vie,,, places God's sovereignity into a 
"mechanistic straight-jacket" because, "hile scientific la" is 
the observed regularity in the "ay the "orld operates, it is 
for Christians simply a statement of the way ",e observe God to 
,,,ork. A second reason that he advances is that to say that 
actions are regular is not to say they are routine, and thus 
"every operation of la,i', scientific or moral, is also God's 
specific ,;ill. ,,24 Reinhold Niebuhr shares this concern that 
God's action should not be seen as something arbitary but he 
is not prepared to equate God's action ",ith scientific law, 
i.e. with "the laws of nature". He 1Yrites: 25 
"The God who judges and condemns man is not 
some capricious tyrant whose "'ill and 'law' 
are irrelevant to the structure of the uni-
verse. Yet he is not merely 'natural la",'. 
It is because he transcends the 'laws of 
nature' in His freedom that He can set a 
law for man, "'ho in his limited ,;ay trans-
cends the 'laws of nature' and cannot be 
bound by them." 
The way Niebuhr uses the term "la",s of nature" is not very help-
ful for it seems to indicate too great a distance between God 
and his creation. To be sure, God is not to be confused with 
22. E.W. Ives op.cit. p.78. 
23. Ibid., p.77. 
24. Ibid., p.78. 
25. R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Nan, Vol. 1, p.141. 
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his creation, but the so-called laws of nature must surely be 
descriptive of God's will. Here we are following Barbour in 
assuming that, while the laws of nature are "abstractions from 
the complex fabric of events"-, they are nevertheless "intended 
to express patterns in nature".26 In other words, the laws of 
nature are not mere human constructs but do in some ways (i.e. 
not fully) describe ,,,hat is real. Given this understanding, 
we must assume that the patterns in nature represent God's will, 
and if this is the case, it is nonsensical to state that God 
transcends the laws of nature. But, where Niebuhr is correct 
is in stressing God's freedom. God must be understood to be free 
in relation to his creation or he is not the "Almighty" of the 
creeds. It is, however, possible to speak of God's freedom even 
"'i thin his operation through the la"s of nature. In this con-
nection, the sphere of nature is possibly mor e problematic than 
that of history27 for it is far easier to conceive God's free-
dom in relation to the on-going human drama than in relation 
to the apparently closed system of cause and effect of blind 
matter. However, the notion of atomic indeterminacy makes it 
28 possible to speale of God's freedom within the laws of nature, 
and in that sense only may it be imagined that God transcends 
these laws. It is clearer, and more accurate theologically, 
from the point of view of God's immanence, and of the doctrine 
26. I.G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Relieion, p.456. 
This is against, for instance, the view that la"s of nature 
are "an order imposed on events by man's mind"(Barbour ibid.) 
for if this were the case it would indeed make sense to say 
that God transcends these laws. 
27. However, in putting the matter this ,,'ay I do not wish to 
create the impression that I understand 'nature' and 'history' 
to be two distinct, totally unrelated spheres. 
28. cf. Barbour, p.428. 
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of creatio continuata, to assert that God works through the 
laws of nature. In terms of God's action through the moral 
judgements in history, the charge of God's action being arbi-
tary is best countered by an understanding which sees the judge-
ments as a law operating in history. Implicit in the under-
standing of this law ,;ill be the notion that all ,aong is puni-
shed. It may be objected that this last point is not verified 
by history and that, in fact, there is much evidence to the con-
trary, but it must be remembered that judgements are, as we have 
seen in Butterfield's treatment of the subject, long-term af-
fairs, and that systems rather than individuals bear the conse-
quences of the jUdgements. 1,'hen the notion of judgement is 
described in these terms it is not at variance ,,,ith the evi-
dence of historical study. And, if it is asserted that not all 
,aong is punished, it seems that the only 1Vay of avoiding the 
belief that God's action through moral judgements is arbitrary 
is to adopt a similar stance to that of Augustine and Calvin 
who had to explain why, given their vie,,' s on election, God's 
action is not arbitrary. Their answer "as to the effect that 
God's providential will is secret and unfathomable. 29 Ives, 
as we have seen, understands judgement to be a generally opera-
tive principle, and, using the sphere of private ethics as an 
analogy, he seeks to explain how judgement operates as "a kind 
of law":30 
"The penalty is inherent in the sin. The penalty 
for selfishness is being a selfish person; the 
punishment for materialism is to dro,m in posses-
sions; the reward of lechery is the coarsening 
of sexual response." 
29. cf. Dictionary of Theology, p.269. 
30. E.W. Ives, op. cit., p.79. 
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The problem ,vith this analoGY is that it does not do justice to 
the depth of the Old Testament understanding of God's judgement 
for, as Langdon Gilkey explains, the Old Testament understanding 
begins at t11is point but develops "in strange and fruitful 1<ays". 
Relying heavily on the work of Von Rad, Gilkey mentions four 
steps in the development. 31 The starting point is that evil 
deeds have evil consequences as part of their essence. Von Rad 
uses the wo·rd "recompense" to describe the ef'fects of' the sin. 32 
The recompense is not a subsequent forensic event originating 
with God but merely "the radiation of the evil ',hich now con-
tinues on".33 Basic to the understanding is the view that "it 
is Jahweh ',ho 'brings the evil man's conduct upon his Olm head'''. 
35 
But, because "sin was also a social category", the consequences 
of an individual's sin may also fallon the community. The next 
step is that, as the seriousness of sin before God is realised, 
it is discovered that the consequences of an evil deed are the 
action of God himself. 36 The penultimate step is the identifi-
cation by the prophets of the fate, i.e. the results of the sin-
ful deeds, with Yahweh. 37 Gilkey points out that Hosea says that 
Yah1<eh is "the ulcer, the enemy, the raging lion with ,,,hom Is-
rael in sin has to deal.,,3 8 And finally, Jeremiah and ~xekiel 
recognize that the sin of Israel is so great that it brings God's 
judgement which is "an historically located and historically 
mediated judgement through the destruction of the social institu-
31. L. Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind, p.262. 
32. G. von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. 1, p.265. 
33. Ibid., p.265. 
34. Ibid., p.265. 
35. Ibid., p.264. 
36. Gilkey, op. cit., p.262. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Ibid. 
34 
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tions Yah,,'eh has created". 39 This brief outline of' the develop-
ment of the idea of judgement in the Old Test a ment indicates 
that if we are to hold that moral judgements are "a kind of law" 
then we must hold, as Ives does, that the operation of every law 
is God's specific will. 
God is at work in history in the moral judgements which, in re-
sponse to the sinfulness of' human nature vhich corrupts good, 
bring about the collapse of the schematised patt e rns of society. 
However, after his positive start in which he states so emphati-
cally that judge ments in history cannot be denied, Butterfield 
is forced to qualify his position in two very important ways. 
These qualifications indicate that the notion of moral judgement 
in history is only of limited value in determining the action of 
God. The qualification arises out of the view that: "The re is 
a sense in which all that we may say on this subject and all the 
moral verdicts that "e pass pass on human history are only valid 
40 
in their application as self-judgements,n This is true in re-
lation to both individuals and the schematised patterns of 
society. Butterf'ield returns time and again to the notion that 
history indicates that all men a re sinne rs. It is because of the 
sin of all men that God is pre s ent in the judgements of history. 
But, as Butterfield points out, the moment that we say that God 
is present in this way we must acknovledge that everyone, "the 
whole of our existing order and the very fabric of our civilisa-
t · 11 41. d . d t lon, lS un e r JU gemen , 1, e may never assume that those who 
39. Ibid. 
40. H. Butterfi e ld, op. cit., p.62. 
41. Ibid., p.52. 
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sUller disaster are more sinlul than othcrs,42 just as we may 
not assume that if we are used in the exercise 01 God's judge-
ment (as England may have been in her victory against Germany) 
,{e have greater virtues than others. 43 Both of these views 
are corollaries of the vie,{ that all men are sinners. Butter-
field is of the opinion that, because "good fortune or ad-
verse conditions playa great but still unmeasured part in the 
development of human beings,,44, the difference bet,,'een the 
"ickedness and responsibility of one man and those of another 
cannot be discussed. He puts it like this:45 
"Indeed, since human responsibility is so 
subtle a substance •.• it is impossible 
to think one man essentially more "icked 
than another save as one might say: 'All 
men are sinners and I am the chief of them'. 
It follows from this that moral judgements 
of actual people cannot defensibly or use-
fully exist in concrete cases save in the 
form of self-judgements." 
Butterfield uses his example of the judgement against the mili-
tarism of Prussia to indicate that even in the area of judge-
ment against the schematised patterns of society, judgement is 
really a self-judgement. He states simply that while he may 
believe that the nation was judged for its militarism, he has 
. 46 
no right to say so. 
The second ,,'ay in which he qualifies his position has to do with 
his understanding of the nature of "scientific history" (or, as 
he sometimes puts it, "techl1.ical history"). He states: "Noral 
42. Ibid., p.62. 
43. Ibid., p.52. 
44. H. Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p.108. 
45. Ibid. 
46. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.63. 
judgements on human beings are by their nature ••• alien to the 
intellectual realm of scientific history".4 7 lie indicates that 
the first problem that an historian has in determining moral 
judgements in history is to decide on the moments at "'hich to 
raise the moral Question. 48 Because of this problem, he believes 
that the moral judgements to "'hich historians point are more 
likely to be political judgements in disguise. 49 It is not im-
portant that he believes that it is impossible for a technical 
historian to pass moral judgements on individuals for "e have 
seen that the moral judgements of God in history are against 
the schematised patterns of society, the systems, rather than 
against individuals. ,ve have also noticed that if judgements 
apply to individuals "e have no "ay of avoiding the conclusion 
that God's action is arbitrary. But it is a different matter "hen 
he indicates that the technical historian cannot assert "that 
Germany has come under judgement for "hat people call her Prus-
sianism".50 It means that the most we can say about moral judge-
ments in history is this: First, that there are moral judgements 
. h' t 51 In lS ory. Second, that historians are not able to identify 
these judgements "ith certainty. Third, that Christians, "ho, 
by means of their interpretation of history, identify tllese 
judgements with the judgements of God, cannot be absolutely sure 
that they have determined the action of God except insofar as 
the judgements are self-judgements. The notion of moral judge-
ments in history provides, therefore, only limited assistance in 
47. H. Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p.lO). 
48. Ibid., p.l04. 
49. Ibid. 
50. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.G). 
51. see ibid., p.57: "That this form of judgement exists in his-
tory is a thing which I believe can hardly be denied." 
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determining the action of God in history. 
As noted earlier in the chapter, Butterfield sees the notion of 
judgement in history to be •• erely an introduction to the study 
of the moral elel.ent in history.52 In his second discussion, 
indicating his belief that there is moral ity in the processes 
and the course of history, Butterfield attempts to explain the 
existence of adversity, suffering and catastrophe, not in terms 
of the consequences of the sinfulness of man (" ,hich is the point 
of his discussion of the moral judgements in history) but as a 
necessary part of the' "Divine Plan".53 
Butterfield begins his argument by pointing out that because the 
chanciness and terrible cataclysms of this century may lead 
people to a feeling of the total meaninglessnes s of everything,54 
the problems of the present time "are still moral-historical ones 
as in the Old Testament times fl • 55 Because the Old Testament 
,vriters found themselves living in a time of terrible cataclys -
mic history, they had to reflect on their history56 and in so 
doing discovered the hand of God in events. For this reason 
Butterfield examines their thinking i n order to dra,., parallels 
for understanding our 0'= experience of tragic history. He sees 
the kind of reflection on history that the Hebrews did so well 
to be necessary because, although some of the catastrophic events 
52. Ibid., p.51. 
53. Ibid., p.84. 
54. Ibid., p.G8f. 
55. Ibid., P • 69 • 
56. Butterfield points out that "hat ,,'a s unique about the ancient 
Hebre,,' s "as their historioeraphy rather than their history. 
Ibid., p. 73. 
in history seem to have been advances (,or cxarople, the lall 
of the Roman Elnpire or the Norman Conquest of EnGland), not 
all are like this. This means that the question of suffering 
is raised, and often in such a "ay that it is clear that the 
solution is not to be found in the notion of moral jUdgements. 
It may be of help to turn directly to Butterfield's conclusion 
.at this stage. It is this: 57 
"If the end of history lies in personalities, 
which represent the highest things , ... e know in 
the mundane realm, then 11e must face the fact 
that the purpose of history is not something 
that lies a thousand years ahead of us •.• the 
end of human history is the manufacture and 
education of human souls. History is the busi-
ness of making personalities, even so to speak 
by putting them through the mill; and, though 
it fails us if .. e expect it to hand us happi-
ness on a spoon, its very vicissitudes bring 
personality itself to a finer texture." 
Butterfield traces the development of this vie11 within the 
thinking of the Hebre11s. The first stage was in their coming 
to see that God was not simply interested in the welfare of 
their nation but also in individuals. 58 The next stage is the 
discovery that the idea of judgement was superimposed on the 
idea of history as Promise. 59 This r.1eant that no matter ho,,, 
severe the judgements in their history ,,'ere, the Hebre"s al-
",·ays held the belief that their history ,,'as one of hope. 
Before the final stage in 11hich they came to grips "ith the 
problem of suffering, there "as a stage of "messianic expecta-
tion".60 Butterfield dismisses this stage, at least in its 
57. Ibid., p.76. 
58. Ibid., p.78. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid. 
I [ 
I 
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prevalent :form, namely, "a hankering' a:fter a political deliv-
erer,"61 as "a simple and :facile kind o:f \{ish:ful thinking".62 
It is in the final stage, '''hich Butter:field calls the "ul tra-
messianic" stage,63 that the Hebrews tackled the problem of 
undeserved catastrophe. The major problem was the discovery 
that the idea of judgement could not account :for the incidence 
of suffering. In response t o this problem the Hebrew prophets 
found new patterns in history. Butterfield refers t6 these 
64 patterns as "myths". Examples of these myths are the simile 
of the leaven that l eavens the "hole lump, or the Rerm1ant of 
65 Israel, but the most important of all is that of the Suffering 
Servant. He says of this myth: " ••• here at any rate is a pattern 
or representation of something which is essential, something 
which lies at the roots of history."66 The notion of the 
Suffering Servant concept allm,s one to consider catastrophe 
without seeing it as a mark of God's special anger against its 
victims. 67 On the contrary, this view allowed Israel to see 
68 her sufferings as a necessary part of God's plan. Seen like 
this, suffering "has its place in the scheme of things,,69 and 
"it provides the nearest thing to a clue for those who wish 
to malee anything out of the human drama." 70 But, onc e -again, 
Butterfield is forced to concede that this view is not self-
61- Ibid., " .79. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Ibid. , p.80. 
64. Ibid. , p.81. 
65. Ibid. , p.82. 
66 . Ibid. , p.83. 
67. Ibid. 
68. Ibid. , ".84. 
69. Ibid. , p.85. 
70. Ibid. 
51 
evident lor, speakinG of vicarious sUlfering, he has to say 
that "nobody has the right to tell anybody else to see his 
sufferings in that way".71 With the concept of the Suffering 
Servant, "the interpretation of the human drama is thr01;n back 
into the intimate recesses of our personal experience tt • 72 But 
this is not to deny the force or reality of the concept, for, 
Butterfield puts it: 73 as 
" ••• though it might be a remarkable thing to find 
an example of the Suffering Servant existing in 
its absolute purity - though there may have been 
only one perfect example of it in history - it is 
impossible to deny this picture its place as the 
pattern or the.w0rking-model of ideas "hich do in 
fact operate throughout the ages,. helping to recon-
cile man "ith his destiny. n 
Finally, Butterfield aclcno,,'ledges that this concept does not 
resolve all the paradoxes of history, and nor does it give a 
completely satisfactory interpretation of the human drama, but 
he does not illustrate or discuss either of these observations. 74 
We noticed above that Butterfield believes that the end of 
history is the "manufacture and education of human souls". He 
also speaks of history as "a pilgrimage of all mankind".75 On 
this pilgrimage there is a constant conllict bet"een good and 
evil. But, 1>arns Butterfield, although 1>e are right if '''e "ant 
to see history in moral terms,76 we are not allo"ed, for in-
stance, to turn our account of the ,,,ars between nations into a 
7l. Ibid. , p.86. 
72. Ibid. 
73. Ibid. , p.S7. 
74. Ibid. 
75. Ibid. , p.9l. 
76. Ibid. 
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conrlict between good and evil. The reason ror this is that 
"in reality the essential strategies in the war or good aeainst 
evil are conducted within the intimate interior or personali-
ties." 77 
It is clear that Butterrield's second discussion of morality in 
history has to do with the problem of surrering. His concern 
is to deal with the kind of suffering that is not a consequence 
of sin. In order to evaluate his discussion we must recognise 
how he approaches the problem. That is to say, "e must notice 
that he does not adopt the usual philosophical approach of 
treating suffering and evil as part of an inconsistent triad. 
In other words, he does not consider the logical problem in-
volved in holding concurrently the three propositions: (i) God 
is good, (ii) God is omnipotent, and (iii) evil (and suffer-
ing '''hich is part of evil) exists. N"d nor does he discuss the 
philosophical and theological problem of the origin or evil. 
This neglect is not necessarily a '· ... eaJ..::ness, :for, as some l'\-Titers 
aCknoWledge,78 there is no real solution to the problem of evil. 
Butterfield's approach, however, begins with the acceptance of 
the presence and reality of suffering. In doing this h~ is 
exhibiting what E. Harris Harbison calls one of the marks of 
the Christian historian, namely, that the Christian historian 
"will not blink the fact of evil in history".79 Butterfield 
77. Ibid. 
78. For instance, Hans Kung: ",{ith intellectual arguments man 
gets no further than Job's friends. Suffering imposes a 
limit to all reasoning. On Being a Christian, p.4Jl. 
79. E.H. Harbison, "The Narks of the Christian Historian", in 
C.T. NcIntire, (ed.), God, History and Historians, p.J54. 
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centinues by turninG to the Old Testament understanding of 
God's presence during a time of cataclysmic history. 
There are remarkable similarities betveen Butterfield's con-
clusion regarding the problem of suffering and that of John 
Hick, though the reason for this is undoubtedly their depen-
dence on the Bible for thier respective solutions. Hick de-
mon8trates that there are "tva attitudes to evil vithin the 
Bible, one based upon the dualistic view of evil as the ir-
reconcilable enemy of God and ",an, and the other upon a profound 
sense of the sale ultimate sovereignity and responsibility of 
God. "80 p..nd he demands that "e retain both of these perspec-
tives by insisting "that evil is really evil and that God has 
really willed for a good purpose a world in which evil, "i th 
. t d . I' t ." 81 ~ s emon~c qua ~ y, ar~ses • Both of these strands are to 
be found in Butterfield's 'solution' to the problem of suffer-
ing. The dualistic strand is found in his suggestion that 
history is a "pilgrimage of all mankind" on which there is a 
constant conflict between good and evil. And the instrwnental 
view of evil, as Hick calls it, is found in Butterfield's 
belief that suffering and catastrophe are necessary parts 'of 
the "Divine Plan".82 His suggestion that "history is the 
business of making personalities, even so to speak by putting 
them through the mill"83 is a similar idea to Hick's one that 
suffering is "a necessary feature of a ,,-arId that is to be the 
80. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p.393. 
81. Ibid., p.398f. 
82. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.84. 
83. Ibid., p.76. 
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scene of a process of soul-J~akinc. ,,8lj Butterfield does not, 
of course, develop the close-knit argument and carefully con-
structed system that Hicl< does, and there are obvious differen-
ces. Hick's idea is that we suffer in order to facilitate our 
0'-'11 gro"th, '''hile the suffering servant concept is one of 
vicarious suffering. Hick recognises the problem with assert-
ing that suffering is necessary for soul-mru<ing. This problem 
is that ,"hile suffering does sometimes enable strength of char-
acter, unselfishness, patience and moral steadfastness etc., 
it can sometimes lead to "resentment, fear, grasping selfishness, 
and tragic disinteg~a~iOn of character ll • 85 Hick therefore 
concludes: " ••• this type of theodicy, "'hich finds its clue to 
the meaning of evil in God's eventual decisive bringing of 
good out of it, is driven to look beyond this world and to tru<e 
seriously the Christian hope of eternal life.,,86 Butterfield 
fails to recognise that while some people benefit by seeing 
. t heir suffering as vicarious suffering, others do not, and 
therein lies the greatest weakness of his belief that suffering 
leads to a heightening of personality. 
Referring back to the first paragraph of this chapter 1>e may 
say that the moral deity has indeed called into being an order 
of creation '''hich has a moral bias. The moral principles that 
may be detected are to be found in the judgements which bring 
about the collapse of the schematised patterns and systems of 
84. J. Hick, op. cit., p.389 and 369ff. 
85. J. Hick, Christianity at the Centre, p.90. 
86. Ibid. 
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society because of human sinfulness, and in the creative out-
come of cataclysm and tragic conflict resulting as it often 
does in a heightening of personality. "liTe have demonstrated, 
ho"ever, that these two areas in which we claim to see the 
operation of the moral factor in history are not "ithout their 
ambiguities, and indeed the operation of the moral factor is 
not even immediately apparent, so ve ought perhaps to be some-
,,'hat more cautious than Butterfield in assuming that in spec-
ific instances of judgement or suffering we have determined 
the action of God in history. 
CHAPTER IV 
HISTORY AND PTIOVIDENCE 
1.Jhen used of God, the 1Vord 'providence' mcans that he foresees 
the future and expresses his care for his creation by providing 
for its needs and guiding the course it takes. l T.H.L. Parker 
makes the point that so far as history is concerned this means 
t,;a things. 2 On the one hand it means that God must be seen 
as continually present and active in history, but on the other, 
God must not be seen as the "only genuine actor in history" f'or 
this "ould negate the idea of man 's freedom and suggest that 
he is a mere puppet 1Vithout cho ice or the p01Ver to act. J These 
two requirelDents are met in Butterfield's treatment of prov-
idence, and they provide a handy frame,·!ork 'vi thin '''hich to 
describe and evaluate his treatment of the subject. 
As has already been established in previous chapters, Butterfield 
is absolutely sure of God's presence in history. 1\Te have seen 
how he is present in the moral judgements of history; how his 
presence is indicated by the tragic nature of much history; 
and how God constantly produces the best possible ,;arId given 
the fact of human cupidity. 1\~en he speaks directly of' provid-
ence, Butterfield deepens his understanding of a God "'ho is 
ah,ays present. His most telling analOGY is that of God being 
4 like a composer. He sees the human story as analogous to a 
1. T.H.L. Parker, "Providence", in A. Richardson (ed.), 
A Dictionary of Christian Theology, p.280. 
2. Ibid. 
J. Ibid. 
4. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.94. 
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piece of orchestral music that we arc playing over for the 
first time. Each person is, so to spe~<, only able to see the 
part for the instrument that he plays, and he is not able to 
see ahead to what is coming. The player only finds out what 
the piece is li1ce as the whole orchestra play tOGether. 1I1hile 
a player may be sure that he understands "hich note he oUGht 
to play next, he is never sure of the implications of it as he 
is unable to tell "hat the others "'ill be playing at the same 
time. To this basic picture Butterfield adds the thought that 
the composer is only composing the piece bit by bit as the 
orchestra is playing it. In doing this the composer allows 
himself the freedom to change his mind regarding the music he 
,,,ished to ,=i te in order to straighten out the >VTong notes 
played by the orchestra. This ru"alogy indicates that there is, 
as Butterfield sees it, "an intelligence moving over the story".5 
The intelligence mruces decisions in response to the things that 
people do, as people can see if they look back over the events 
of their lives. Butterfield sums it up like this: 6 
"There is no symbolic presentation that will 
do justice to history save the composer I 
have already mentioned, "ho composes the 
music as ','e go along, and, "hen "e slip into 
aberrations, switches his course in order to 
make the best of everything. History is like 
the work of a person in that its course .•• 
is so unpredictable; "hile yet there is some 
fixidity in it too, and even "hen the unpre-
dictable has happened we cna go back and ac-
count for it retrospectively, we can sho" 
that there "as organisation in it all the 
same." 
Butterfield knows of at least one cOJ;]pelling reason for believ-
5. Ibid., p.109. 
6. Ibid. 
inc that there is this orcanisation "'hich indicates the presence 
of a provident God in the processes of history. He speaks of 
this reason as the "ay in which history "goes on over our heads".7 
By this he means that althouGh all of us are involved in the 
business of making history, history is not simply the product 
of any individual' s ,>1 11. Rather, history is made up of the 
compounding of the effects of all individual wills 8 and by a 
number of other factors which have the effect of "no" deflecting 
the result of our actions, no" taking our purposes out of our 
hands. and now' turning our endeavours to ends not realised. n9 
Butterfield believes that this is what Ramee discovered, and to 
,.,hich he referred "hen he spoke of something remaining in history 
that is unexplained and "'hich he sometimes fe lt to be an occult 
force at ,<ork. 
One of the factors referred to above is the existence of a 
"Providence that "e must regard as lying in the v ery constitut-
ion of things. nlO By this Butterfield means that "e are bound 
11 to ackno,,'ledge that "e a r e born into a providential order. 
He believes that the existence of this providential order must 
be apparent to everyone, ,,'hether Christian or not. One' in-
dication of the providential order is the idea of progress. 
Butterfield is careful to guard aGainst any understanding that 
Providence is progress and that progress is the raison de' 
~ of history because of his notion that some of our orders 
7. Ibid. , p.94. 
8. Ibid. , p·9J· 
9. Ibid. , p.94. 
10. Ibid. , p.95. 
ll. Ibid. , p.96. 
59 
and systems, particularly those in ' ,"hich the progress implies 
"d d d 1 t "d d 12 a one-Sl e eve opmen , are JU ge . Dut although he avoids 
the extreme view, he says:13 
"But I think that I may differ lrom some people 
in feeling that progress all the same is itself 
the ,. ork of Providence, and is part of that 
providential order, part of that history-making 
which goes on almost, so to speak, above our 
heads. t1 
Progress is only discovered by postrationalism and it is in 
that sense that it goes on above our heads. Progress operates, 
lor instance, by the process of the accumulation of kno,,,ledge 
""hich permits a new· generation to continue its advance from the 
point ,,,here the previous generation left off. This kind of 
progress is not achieved through merit, and nor does it imply 
a necessary improvement in our personalities. 14 This latter 
point is made clearly and forcefully by Langdon Gilkey in his 
discussion of the problems involved in the notion of a pro-
gressive history. He indicates that '''hile the norms under 
",hich our freedom operates can rise, i.e. progress, "the rel-
ation of our freedom to these ascending norms does not itself 
develop, and so our use of these ne,,, instruments, this new 
self-consciousness and of these ne", social structures does 
not also itself progress".15 Butterfield illustrates his under-
standing of this form of proe;ress by pointing to the develop-
mentto"ards larger organisations as seen in the development 
from city-state and inter-municipal trade, to the nation-state 
12. Ibid., p.97. 
13. Ibid., p.96. 
14. Ibid., p.97. 
15. L. Gilkey, Reaping the Whirl,,,ind, p.275. 
and 
and 
Go 
inter-na tional trade, and t hen to the v a st imperial systems 
16 
a world economy. Insofar as they are caught up in this 
form of progress, Butterfield says that men are "agents of deeper 
processes than those of "'hich they are a.-lare, instruments of a 
providence that combines their labours and ,;arks them into a 
- 17 larger pattern." 
One of the other factors ' ,hich contribute to the impression 
that history goes on over our heads is "hat Butterfield calls 
"another kind of Providence '''hich it may be permissible to call 
18 human." The e s sential feature of this kind of providence is 
the collective "' isdom of the human race,19 and Butterfield 
describes the effect of this feature like this: 20 
"It is as though, once the history has happ e ned, 
1>'ith all its accidents and tragedies, it is fur-
ther worked upon by the reflecting activity of 
an ordaining and reconciling mind; or as though, 
once a handful of chance notes have be e n struck 
together on the piano, some person refuses to let 
the matter lie there and sets out to resolve the 
disc ord. " 
He believes that the function of this kind of providence is that 
of creating good out of evil. 21 He gives n umerous illustra-
tions of this; for instance, the "ars of Protestants and Cath-
olics after the Reformation "hich brought about a new order 
characterised by toleration. He points out that ',hile neither 
party ' -Tfu-,.ted tol e ration, nor even -thought of it as an ideal, 
16. H. Butterfield, op. cit., p.97. 
17. Ibi d. 
18. Ibid., p.98. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid. This is an idea ,,'hich he noticed in Acton's ,;ark. 
See H. Butterfield, Lord Acton, p.5. 
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they dsicovered arter it had been established that it was not 
merely the best thin~ that Providence could arrange in a world 
of reli~ious difrerences but that it was so good an arrangement 
that "they actually came to rejoice in it.,,22 The operation 
or this l~ind of providence is also detected in the "ay in ,,·hich 
people learn to profit by experience as they reflect on the 
disasters of a given generation. Butterfield feels that through 
such a "process of after-rerlectiori" these disasters are "some-
"hat redeemed". 23 Because he believes that providence lies in 
the very constitution of things , he believes that it is futile 
to attempt to achieve our 0'= purposes in history. 
ought to co-operate with Providence. 24 
Rather, we 
It is obvious from the above discussion that Butterfield sees 
God as continually present and active in history. The second 
of T.H.L. Parker's requirements for an adequate understanding 
or God's providence in history is that God should not be seen 
as the only genuine actor in history. Butterfield certainly 
does not see God as the only genuine actor in history. This is 
made quite clear by a statement such as: " ..• history is al1"ays 
a story in ,·,hich Providence is countered by human aberration.,,25 
And "e noted in an earlier chapter26 that providence does the 
best that human beings have left possible for it at any time. 
22. H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p.99. For further 
illustrations of this see The Whig Interpretation of History, 
p .• 8~, and The Enfjlis]unan and His History, p.116. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid., p.lo6. 
26. Chapter II, p.26. 
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Butter:field actually suggests that when ,,,e think o:f the action 
o:f God in history, we should not think o:f "a heavy hand inter-
posed to inter:fere with the ,;orking o:f a heavy piece o:f machi-
27 28 
nery". He adds: 
"Perhaps a better picture o:f our situation would 
be that o:f a child who played her piece very badly 
",hen she was alone, but "hen the music -teacher sat 
at her side played it passably well, though the 
music-teacher never touched her, never said any-
thing, but operated by pure sympathetic attraction 
and by just being there." 
He also says: "Perhaps history is a thing that would stop hap-
pening if God held His breath, or could be imagined as turning 
a",ay to think of something else.,,29 While these analogies in-
dicate that Butter:field recognises the :freedom and po",er to act 
,,,hich human beings possess, they are misleading in that God is 
not to be imagined as simply enabling, or ",illing, the continu-
ation of human history, :for it is essential that we understand 
him to be actively involved in guiding its course. If this is 
not asserted, God's sovereignty is hopelessly compromised in 
that man, rather than God, will ultimately determine the goal 
of history, and, ,,,ha t is more important, we will fail to take 
account of the eschatological elements '''hich "bulk large in both 
Old and New Testaments".JO The existence of these elements is 
one of the reasons which leads Gilkey to believe that "e should 
interpret providence eschatologically.Jl Butterfield does not 
agree, but we caru,ot discuss this di:fference until we have lo-
cated his thought within the development of the doctrine of 
27. H. Butterfield, loco cit., p.lll. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid. 
JO. L. Gilkey, op.cit., p.27J. 
Jl. Ibid., p.274. 
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providence in recent years. 
Butterfield's thought was influenced by the nature of the crisis 
of his time. The crisis arose out of the existence of the 
"general chanciness and terrible cataclysms of the t",entieth 
32 
century". The experience of the crisis and its resultant in-
fluence on the theology of the time was remarkably different 
to that of the preceeding century. Ninet~enth century liberal 
theology ",as itself greatly influenced by the spirit of its 
age. Development in two areas 'fed' this spirit of the age, 
namely the development of historical science and the develop-
ment of natural science. 33 Regarding the development of his-
torical science, Reinhold Niebuhr believes that "it was the 
genuine achievement of modern historical science to discover 
that human cluture is subject to indeterminate development.,,3 4 
This, he believes, resulted in the final demise of the cyclical 
interpretation of history and also of the static conception of 
history '''hich characterized the Middle Ages. 35 It further re-
suIted in the belief that historical development is a redemp-
tive process. 36 The development of natural science, which in 
the nineteentll century indicated that nature itself is subject 
to growth,37 added to the general sense of optimism of the age. 
The key problem for theology in the nineteenth century arose, 
as Karl Barth puts it, "from the conviction that the guiding 
32. H. Butterfield, loco cit., p.68. 
33. R. Niebuhr, Faith and History, p.2. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
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principle of theology must be confrontation with the contempo-
rary age and its various conceptions, self-understandings, and 
self-evidences, its genuine and less e;enuine 'movements', its 
supposed or real progress".38 The result was that the notion 
of progress was central in liberal theology. Gilkey illustra-
tes this with reference to Schleiermacher and Albrecht Ritschl. 39 
Schleiermacher's understanding of God's action in history is 
that God is at ,,,ork in and through the la,,'s of the natural pro-
cesses of temporal development rather than by either initially 
setting up a closed, self-sufficient system as understood by 
. 40 
the deists, or by intervening miraculously in In.story. As he 
sees it, causal law and providence "entirely coincide".41 Fur-
ther, Gilkey interprets his understanding of divine causality 
to be progressive in its fundamental character. 42 Gilkey con-
cludes that for Schleiermacher the creative and redemptive de-
velopment over time of the levels of human self-consciousness 
4~ 
culminate in an intrahistorical redemptive goal . ~ Ritschl 
had a similar view, namely, that in history God's providence 
realized man's full humanity as a moral personality,44 though 
he sees it happening in quite a different way to that described 
by Schleiermacher. Gilkey sums up by stating that botn of these 
theologians, while quite diverse, interpreted Christianity "as 
centered on the providential activity of God in and through the 
natural, creaturely forces of history,,4 5 , and, that in their 
38. K. Barth, The Humanity of God, p.16. 
39. L. Gilkey, op.cit., p.210-216. 
40. Ibid., p.210. 
41. Ibid., p.211. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Ibid., p.231. 
45. Ibid., p.216. 
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thinking history is "unequivocally a sequence illustratine a 
proeressive development; and God's work of salvation is unequi-
46 
vocally a work achieved in and through that development". 
This understanding which equates providence with progre s s "as 
possible before the twentieth century experience of the risky, 
cataclysmic character of history to "hich Butterfield refers. 
But, before considering how his experience of history led him to 
modify the understanding of providence "e have considered above, 
we need to consider the response of the so-called dialectical, 
or Krisis, theology in order that "e may determine the diff'erence 
bet"een his re sponse and that of his contemporar i es. 
There is a ractical change in thinking from the liberal theology 
of the nineteenth century to the dialectical theology of this 
century. Karl Barth describes ho" in reaction to discovering 
that almost all his theological teachers supported the "ar 
policy of Wilhelm II he came to the realization that he could 
not support their theology any 10nger: 47 
" ••• I suddenly r ealiz e d that I could no longer 
follow either their ethics and dogmatics or their 
understanding of the Dible and of history. For 
me at least, 19th century theology no longer held 
any future." 
Although the Barth of The Epistle to the Romans has a far 
stronger antihistoric~emphasis than the Barth of' Church Dog-
t · III·. ) ,48 h· d t d· f h· t d . d . rna lCS _ lS un ers an lng 0 lS ory an prOVl ence In 
each case is, like that of the other dialectical theologians, 
46. Ibid., p.215. 
47. K. Barth, op.cit., p.l). 
48. cf. L. Gilkey, op. cit., p.218 and J. Nacquarrie, Twen-
tieth Century Religious Thought, p.)21. 
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radically di:f:ferent to that o:f the liberal theologians. Gilkey 
mentions at least :five points which illustrate the 'new' (in 
relation to the 19th century) understanding o:f the dialectical 
theologians 49 and its results. Firstly, God is understood to 
work in history "only inwardly through his liord o:f judGement and 
of grace in creating inner repentance, :faith, decision, and obed-
ience; he does not "ork 'oub,ardly' at all directing nature and 
social history to the :fulfilment of their 0'= intrinsic goal or 
goals.,,50 Secondly, the dialectical theologians set up a kind 
of dualism bet"een God and history. This dualism "pre-
served both the autonomy of creatures and the goodness of God, 
but it was one which made it difficult if not impossible :for 
dialectical theology to explicate how God is sovereignly at 
work in and through the autonomy of mankind. ,,51 The dualism 
"las virtually inevitable given, :for instanc e, Brunner's ins is-
tence that the lordship of God is to be interpreted as a lord-
ship of love "'hich calls for a personal decision,52 for this is 
to accord human freedom absolute freedom in relation to God's 
grace. Thirdly, as a result o:f the deep consciousness of evil 
in twentieth century historical life, the dialectical theolo-
gians came to believe that if there is meaning in history it 
must either transcend historical developments or it must be 
"in"ard in existential appropriation "here alone meaning could 
be :found".53 There ",as thus a sense of the moral and religious 
meaninglessness of history. Fourthly, the view of providence 
49. L. Gilkey, Ope cit., p.222-226. 
50. Ibid., p.222:f. 
51. Ibid., p.225. 
52. Ibid., p.403 n.78. 
53. Ibid., p.224. 
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as active in natural history was di:f:ficult :for them because o:f 
their "omnipresent (i:f unadmitted) 'naturalisln'" 54 , i.e. their 
understanding that the lavs o:f nature a r e explanatory o:f all 
natural events. Ancilliary to this belie:f ",as the view that 
evil is to be explained in terms of these lavs o:f nature and 
not by re:ference to God's will. Fi:fthly, because all that we 
kno;, of God is kno",n in and through the personal encounter of 
:faith, providence can only be an artical of faith in the sense 
of an abstract artical of faith. For instance, this is made 
clear by Bultmann who believes that there is no concept o:f 
providence in the Ne", Testament, only the belief that nothing 
happens apart :from the "'ill of God. 55 And Barth, who in Church 
Dogmatics III:) discusses providence at length, asserts that 
belief in providence is faith in the sense that "this means 
first that it is a hearing and receiving o:f the 1{ord of God."5 6 
To assert that God rules is a confession ""'hich is possible 
only as the confession of faith or not at all".57 It is clear 
therefore that while the liberal theoloEians made providence one 
o:f the corner-stones of their theology, the dialectical theolo-
gians were only able to speak of providence ,dth di:fficulty. 
No,; that we have considered the t",o major and yet radically 
opposite vie"s of providence in the theology of the last t",o 
centuri es ",e may return to Butterfield's treatment of the sub-
ject. How has Butterfield avoided the problems associated 1,ith 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid., p.404 N.84. 
56. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics Vol. III:), p.l5. 
57. Ibid. 
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these positions? And, has he managed to capitalise on the im-
portant and positive points? Butterfield's position is in some 
ways like that of Rciru~old Niebuhr. Niebuhr is counted among 
the dialectical theoloGians by Gilkey58, and J.lacquarrie, who 
discusses Niebuhr's ,,,ork in his chapter on "Post-liberal Theo-
logy in the English-speaking Countries" rather than in the 
chapter on "The Theology of the Word", points out that the dif-
ferences beb"een Niebuhr and continental dialectical theology 
should not blind us to the affinities between them. 59 He sug-
gests that a reason for this is that the same kinds of influen-
ces were at work S~a;ing their theologies. 60 Yet, a major dif-
. ference bet"een Niebup..I' and the dialectical theologians ,,'as that 
the interpretation of history ,,'as a central concern of Niebuhr's 
61 theology. Niebuhr shared the concern of these theologians 
that the optimistic, progressive view of history of the liberal 
theologians could not be squared with the experience of catas-
trophe and evil of the h"entieth century, but, like Butterfield, 
he did not attempt to solve the problem by removing God from the 
general processes of history.62 
As ,,,e have seen, Butterfield is clearly against the liberal theo-
58. L. Gilkey, op. cit., p.225. 
59. J. }]acquarrie, op. cit., p.J45. 
60. Ibid. 
61. cf. L. Gilkey, op. cit., p.400 n.42. 
62. It could be argued that some of the dialectical theologians 
do not remove God from the general processes of history. 
For instance, Barth asserts God's sovereignty over all his-
totical events in Church Dogmatics III:J. Yet, as Gilkey 
points out, he still subordinates general history to sacred 
history and implies that general history has no meaning of 
its 0,=. Gilkey, op. cit., p.220. 
logians in that he does not believe that the general meaning of 
life can be based on the idea of progress. 63 The judgement that 
he speaks of, and "hich f'orms part of his understanding of the 
providence of God, negates the notion of a progressive under-
standing of history. But this understanding also indicates his 
disagreement with dialectical theology for it indicates that 
God is very much at work in the general processes of' history 
and not only in those '''hich are to be associated with sacred, 
or salvation, history. For instance, his understanding of' 
God's action in history is radically different to that of Rudolf 
Bultmann, ",ho, in the Theology of the Ne,,. Testame nt, virtually 
excludes providence from the processes of history by indicating 
that the world is ruled by demonic po",ers and that the Christian 
places his trust in the eschatological event of Christ rather 
. 64 than in the divine sov ereignity over hlstory. Butterfield, 
however, does agree "ith some of the basic understandings of 
the dialectical theologians. For example, he says that every 
. 65 instant is eschatologlcal. To this "e must lin1e his under-
standing of God ,,'orking to enhance personality and especially 
his emphasis on this happening in "ultra-historical realms".66 
By this he means that "the interpretation of the human "drama is 
thro,m back int o the intimate recesses of our personal ex-
perience. I ,67 His belief that moral judgements in history are 
essentially self-jUdgements 68 is an illustration of this, as is 
63. H. Butterfield, Chri.stianity and History, p.96. 
64. See L. Gilkey, op. cit., p404 n.84. 
65. H. Butterfield, 10. cit., p.l2l. 
66. Ibid., p. 86. 
67. Ibid. 
68. H. Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p.lo6. 
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his assertion that "in reality the essential strategies in the 
war of good against evil are conducted "ithin the intimate in-
terior of personalities. "69 His notion of God 1'orking in the 
"intimate recesses of our personal experience" is similar to 
the emphasis of dialectical theology on God 1'orking in his-
tory im,ardly through his 1,ord of judgement and of grace in 
creating iru,er repentance, faith , decision and obedience. 70 
It is because God is at ,.,ork in the intimate recesses of our 
personal experience that each moment is for Butterfield eschato-
logical. Bul tmann agre e s "i th the as s ertion that every in-
stant is eschatological though he indicates that he "ould have 
preferred Butterfield to say: "Every instant has the possibi-
lity of being an eschatological instant and in Christian faith 
this possibility is realised".71 Butterfield never hints at 
an ultimate fulfilment of Godls purposes 1'ithin history, and 
that more than anything indicates his affinity to dialectical 
theology rather than liberal theology. It is apparent, there-
fore, that Butterfield avoids the serious errors of both liberal 
theology and dialectical theology. That is to say, he does not 
equate providence "ith progress, and nor does he locate Godls 
action solely in "ultra-historical realms". 
The reference above to Butterfield's vie" that every ins tant is 
eschatological brings us back to the diff'erence bet,,'een his un-
derstanding and that of Langdon Gilkey. When Gilkey says that 
we ought to interpret providence eschatologically he means that 
69. H. Butterfield, Christianity and HistorY, p.91. 
70. See Page 54 (just after ref. 49) of thesis. 
71. R. Bultmann, History and Eschato"logy, p.154. 
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,,,e should interpret it with re~erence to the end of history un-
derstood in the sense of including a ~u1:fi1ment in the temporal 
~uture. l,e have already noticed that Butterfield understands 
that each moment can supply all the meaning that is required to 
make sense of history, and we said that this is one of the sim-
ilarities of his thought with dialectical theology. Gilkey 
72 hm,ever moves beyond dialectical theology. He believes that 
a picture of history as a rather grim and pointless cycle of 
creativity and destruction is reflected in dialectical theology. 
He puts it like this: 7J 
"(Dialectical th~ologians) took the continuing 
ambiguity of history ,,'ith intense seriousness, 
and thus understood general history in terms ex-
clusively of this cyclical drama of creation, sin, 
forgiveness and possible rene,,,al, but the continua-
tion of sin within the renewal. For them, there-
fore, the course of history never approaches the 
Icingdom ; or to put this point another way, the 
eschatoloe;ical end is equidistant from every point 
in history." 
He has two objections to this view. First, the eschatological 
elements in both the Old and the New Testaments point to ne",-
ness for history and not just for individuals. 74 And, secondly, 
because human beings are " social, historical beings as ",ell as 
individual, inward, private beings", the basic human relation 
to the future is not merely to an individual future but also to 
a social one. 75 His solution is to treat providence and escha-
to10gy together ~ hence his suggestion that providence should 
72. Gilkey also discusses the eschatological theologies of Pannen-
berg, Holtmann , et.al. and proceeds to construct a theology of 
God's action in history based on a synthesis of the categories 
of providence and eschatology which reflect the positive ele-
ments of the dialectical and eschatological theologies. 
73. L. Gilkey, op. cit., p.27J. 
74. Ibid. 
75. Ibid. 
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be treated eschatologically. He believes that if history is 
understood providentially "ithout eschatology then providence 
is vie1led statically and the ambiGuity of the present is seen 
as the final "ord of God for history.?6 Gilkey's major contri-
bution, therefore, is the sUGGestion that providence be related 
to the future as "ell as the present and past. Thus providence 
is partly "the creative source of new possibilities in each sit-
uation"?? and these possibilities are defined by the ultimate 
goal of GOd.?8 The present is not neglected for our certainty 
for the future is based on our present Christian experience.?9 
Gilkey is acutely a"are of the "dilemma beb,een an incredible 
final social goal of history "i th history's individuals, or an 
abstractive transhistorical haven for individuals "ithout his-
tory's social achievements and without even the real ontological 
context for those individuals".80 He believes though that he 
escapes this dilemma by follo,ving Gustav Aulen in interpreting 
theological symbols - in this case providence and eschatology -
through an understanding of God rather than just by and through 
81 the symbols alone. Thus, in providence God is not experienced 
mere ly as "the source of our continuing being" and "the ground 
of the possibilities "hich our freedom can actualize", -but also 
as "the initiator of our reconciliation "ith him, "ith our own 
authentic selves and "'ith our fello"s".82 He concludes: 83 
76. Ibid. , p.293. 
77 • Ibid. , p.264. 
78. Ibid. , p.290. 
79. Ibid. , p.295. 
80. Ibid. , p.296. 
81. Ibid. 
82. Ibid. , p.297. 
83. Ibid. 
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"The divine li:fe thus represents an ultimate being 
:from which autonomous beings :flo\{ into process and 
continue in b eing , a creative logos in which auto-
nomous beings are in turn creative uuder the divine 
guidance of new possibilities, and a divine love 
through '''hich these creatures a re brought back into 
relation ",ith one another and int o the divine li:fe. 
This reunion of individuals "'i th one another and of 
each with their divine ground begins here and is 
the basis of the new r eality and quality of life 
experienced everywhere that the redemptive :forces 
of history are experienced. It is not experi enced 
in fullness here, but it points both in promise 
and in its 0'= intentionality beyond this life to 
a final completion". 
In conclusion, ,,'e have noticed in this chapter that if "'e are to 
determine the actio~ of God in history, he must be understood 
to do three things. Firstly, he must be active in the processes 
of history. In other ,,'ords, his sovereignty over history must 
be asserted. He must be understood to be actively ruling his-
tory. Secondly, he must act in such a ,,.ay that he does not ne-
gate human freedom. As it was put in the first paragraph, he 
must not be understood to be the only genuine actor in history. 
History is 'open', as it is sometimes put. And, thirdly, part 
of his activity must be aimed at bringing history to a eulmi-
nation. This, too, is an expression of God's sovereignty over 
history. Il'e have discovered that Butterfield's treatment -of 
providence accords sufficient attention to the first two of these 
but no t to the third. 
FAITH AND GOD lYI10 ACTS 
The first c),apter of this thesis introduced both the problem of 
the determination of God's action in history, and Butterfield's 
approach to solving it. The next three chapters ,.,ere concerned 
1<ith a detailed exposition of Butterfield's understanding of 
God's action in history and a critique thereof. lye have no,., 
reached the stage ,.,here it is necessary to s t ate our conclu-
sions. As it will be seen, the two conclusions drawn in this 
chapter do not contradict Butterfield's general thesis, but 
seek to focus and develop it. 
How may God's action in history be determined? Our first con-
clusion may be put in the words of David Bosch: "That God acts 
in the "orld is something discernible only by the eye of faith".l 
This conclusion returns us to our discussion of the first chap-
ter in 1Vhich we noticed that Butterfield is reluctant to use the 
"ord 'faith' in describing the Christian interpretation of his-
tory. But, as the subsequent chapters have demonstrated, while 
Butterfield seldom uses the word 'faith', the concept of faith 
is present in nearly all that he has to say about God's· action in 
history. One of the clearest illustrations of this was found in 
the second chapter where "e indicated that Butterfield ackno,,,-
ledges the need for discovering God in one's 0''''' experience be-
1. David Bosch, Witness to the World, p.232. 
Because the word 'faith' will be used a great deal in this 
chapter, I should like to indicate that while I understand 
faith to include the element of belief (understood as 
'seeing' and 'understanding' rather than 'doctrine'), I 
understand it to mean primarily trust "hich leads to obe-
dience. 
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:fore one is able to see him at ",ork in secular history.2 1,e 
have noticed how he returns to this understanding at almost 
every stage of his argument. For instance, he argues that there 
are moral judgements in history but he cannot claim that it is 
apparent to everyone that these judgements are the judgements 
of God. 3 Or, he can assert that the Old Testament concept of' 
the Su:ff'ering Servant makes sense of sOllle :forms of suffering 
today, but he is :forced to concede that with this concept too, 
the interpretation of' secular history is forced into "the inti-
mate recesses of personal experience".4 He often speaks of 
the need for "a religious view of lif'e"5 which "'ill colour our 
interpretation of history and the ,,,ay in which he uses the phrase 
indicate s that he has in mind "'hat 've have referred to as faith. 
It is clear then, that Butterfield ",ould f'ind no problem ",ith 
the statement that it is only by the eye of' f'aith that one is 
able to discern the action of God in history. 
The fact that history is so ambiguous, so full of both good and 
bad influences, so inconclusive in its results, and so slow to 
indicate a clear direction or course, seems to indicate that our 
understanding, namely that it is necessary to start ",ith faith 
rather than history in attempting to determine God's action in 
history, makes better sense of the available data than the vie", 
that God's action can be seen ,,"i thout reference to faith. Bosch 
indicates that he f'eels that the character of history is such 
2. Thes.is page 29. 
3. Thesis page 47. 
4. Thesis page 51. 
5. For instance, in Christianity and History, p.35 and p.116. 
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that even the believer is not always clear about God's action 
in history:6 
"The believer's interpretation o~ God's acts in 
history nevertheless remains an ambivalent matter. 
God's activities cannot be derived directly ~rom 
history. History is ~ull of contradictions, gaps, 
discontinuities, puzzles, surprises, mysteries, 
temptations, and confusions • ••• God's activities 
in history are therefore for the eye of faith sim-
ultaneously revealed and hidden." 
Karl La,fith is even more harsh in hisjud"ement in that he ex-
cludes any possibility of meaning in history ,,,hatsoever. 7 As far 
as he is concerned, man's historical experience is one of steady 
failure and this fact defeats every attempt to arrive at a philo-
sophy of history. 
It is simply not clear that God's action in history can be seen 
,·,ithout faith, and to assert that it can be seen is contrary to 
the evidence of the Ne,,, Testament. In an interesting discussion, 
James 1·1. Robinson argues that the terms 'faith' and 'understan-
ding' are closely associated in Nark. 8 In the Narkan usage 'un-
derstanding' does not fall outside the scope of the term 'faith'. 
Nark does not associate the problem of understanding "i th intel-
lectual clarification but with the problem of 'hardness of heart', 
and, as his discussion of understanding the parables sho,,'s, there 
are t,m levels of understanding. At the one level the 'seeing' 
and 'hearing' "is exemplified by those who 'hear' the word but 
then fall a .. ay".9 This kind of seeing and hearing is equivalent 
to the hardness of heart from which the opponents of Jesus suffer. 
6. D. Bosch, op. cit., p.2JJ. 
7. lC. L6with, Heaning in History, p.19lf~. 
8. James H. Robinson, The Problem of Historv in Nark, p.7J-78. 
9. Ibid., p. 77. 
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The second level, called 'knowine' and 'ullderstandinG' is exem-
plified by those who hear the vord, receive it, and bear fruit. 
The important point for our present discussion is that the second 
level is given by God. Robinson dra.'s attention to Hark 4:ll and 
lO points out that the passive form implies God as the agent. If 
God's activity is discerned throueh an understanding vhich is it-
self God's gift to some, it is not true that his activity in his-
tory is generally apparent. 
There are, however, two serious objections to the view that God's 
acts can be discerned only by faith. The first of these is the 
objection raised by Pannenberg and "hich "e noticed in the first 
chapter in our survey of recent developments in the doctrine of 
revelation. At that stage ve did not attempt to deal ",'ith the 
problem, but ,,'e mus t do so no, ... Briefly, the problem is this: 
Pannenberg argues that historical revelation is open to anyone 
"ho has eyes to see, that is, faith is not the basis for deter-
mining God's action. He says, for example, ",\1'lat Jah"eh accom-
plished in history cannot be .,ri tten off as the imagination of 
the pious soul, for its inherent meaning of revealing the deity 
II 
of Jah"eh is impressed on everyone". While this quot-ation 
makes Pannenberg's position appear radically different to that 
of, say, the dialectical theologians, it is not as different as 
it is sometimes assumed. Charles Villa-Vicencio argues correctly 
that because of his emphasis upon the history of the transmission 
of tradition, Pannenberg does not maintain that there is a reve-
lO. Ibid., p.77 n.l. 
ll. If. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p.lJ6. 
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lation in historical fact apart from the COJltext of traditions 
12 
and interpretations in which it took place. Villa-Vicencio 
concludes: "This results in the demarcation between Pannenberg 
and such theologians as Barth and Bultmann to be less obvious 
than PannengerG's polemic at times leads one to believe".l) 
In the context of our present discussion we would say that the 
traditions and interpretations referred to above a re to be seen 
as part and parcel of the faith understanding of the community 
or of the individual. Villa-Vicencio also indicates that it is 
not all that apparent that Pannenberg's historical judgements 
are not influenced by his theology. If this is the case, then 
his ovn theological enterprise indicates that he is "rong in 
assuming that history ought to influence faith, rather than that 
faith should influence our understanding of history. Villa-
Vicencio's criticism is based on ,,,hat he understands to be Pan-
nenberg's failure to support from empirical evidence his argu-
ment that it is 
raised from the 
possible 
14 dead. 
to show historically that Jesus was 
In seeking to verify the truth of his 
claims by reference to the apocalyptic conceptual "orld Pannen-
berg's argument is, argues Villa-Vicencio, either anthropological 
or theoloeical but not historical. 15 Langdon Gilkey also be-
lieves that Pannenberg's theology influences his history. He 
stresses that the uniqueness of the resurrection cannot be seen 
on the basis of historical inquiry alone, and so he also accuses 
Pannenberg of applying a "faith judgement" in his understanding 
12. Charles Villa-Vicencio, "The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg", 
in Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, 1'0.16. , p.30. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid., p.35. 
15. Ibid. j 
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or the resurrection. Gilkey's reason is that we can only II'have' 
an event", as he puts it, by means of the canons or historical 
inquiry (i.e. the canons of homoGeneity and analogy), 
the resurrection must be accepted as 'there' on other 
and so, 
16 grounds. 
This brings us to the second major problem with asserting that 
God's action in history is discernible only by the eye of faith. 
By stating that we ought to start with raith rather than history 
are we not saying that ,,,hat is required is "faith-filled subjectiv-
ity?tt 1 7 In other words, if we start with faith, is our under-
standing of God's action in history ever objective, or is it al-
,,'ays a mere personal interpretation? While this may appear to 
be a serious problem at first glance, it is soon apparent that 
all historical inquiry has to race this question. If we are 
forced to conclude that it is impossible to begin our attempts 
to determine the action of God in history "ith fa ith because . this 
makes our findings too subjective , then ,,,e must assume that, for 
the same reasons, the historian's task is futile. Langdon Gilkey 
,rrites that "if we confine the term objectivity alone to those 
inquiries "'hich are completely free ab initio of any presupposed 
theory ••• then history cannot be called objective. ,,18 . He gives 
four reasons for his vie" that history is not free of any pre-
supposed theory . (i) The historian does not start "ith given and 
solid 'facts' or ' events' but "ith documents, records, reports, 
16. L. Gilkey, Reaping the 1fuirl1dnd, p.361 n.35. 
17. It seems that the term "faith-filled subjectivity" is that 
of H. Kahler who suggested that if a two-level ontological 
concept of reality is descarded it must be replaced by a 
t,w-level epistemological view of history in ',hich the same 
event can be looked at from b"o different points of view. 
See, Robert J. Blaikie, Secular Christianity and God ,"ho acts, 
p.160. 
18. L. Gilkey, Ope cit., p.102. 
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etc. from "hich he rnllst construct ,,'hat he recards as the 'facts' 
or 'events,.19 This means that "the same interpretive principles 
that guide the formation of his conclusions direct his lOGically 
prior reconstruction of the facts "hich his conclusions seek to 
make intelligible".20 (ii) The '",hole s', or ' univ ersals' , by 
"'hich the historian seeks to explain his reconstructed facts are 
21 
mental constructs. And, because everything in history is " sit -
uation-dependent", periodization is essentia l to all historical 
inquiry. nut the role of presupposed theory is illustrated in 
that while the period must be conceived on the basis of the data 
50 that the data can in turn be made into 'facts' "'hich are set 
,,,i thin an int e lligible "hole, the formation of the period is 
"guided by the historian's most elusive yet crucial feelings of 
qualitative similarity and dissimilarity , of continuities and 
changes, by his or her assessments of attitudes, goals and norms, 
and by his ju<;igements of what is or i s no t significant in his -
22 torical change n • (iii) The process of selection is an indis-
pensible part of the historian's task. And, as Gilkey puts it, 
"selection, like reconstruction, is grounded in the historian's 
'ontological beliefs,,,.23 (iv) There are no important historical 
judgements without moral assessments. 24 Gilkey conclud-es -that 
this meB-TlS that historical inquiry presupposes, both for the 
construction of 'facts' and ' events', and for the construction 
19. Ibid., p.99. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid. Exa~ples of these 'universals' are: the barbarian 
invasions, Norman conquest, Industrial Revolution, colonial 
expansion, French Revolution, etc. 
22. Ibid., p.lOO. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid. 
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of the contexts ,dthin ,,.hich these are intelligiblc, "a per-
spective on the part of the historian that can be called an 
implicit philosophy of history.,,2 5 
To sum up our discussion, it is evident that to assert that God's 
action in the world is something discernible only by the eye of 
faith is not to superimpose something upon history, but has 
merely to do with the choice of the philosophy of history by 
'''hich "e seel~ to interpret the data available to the historian. 
We have noticed also that this conclusion is inescapable, for 
even Pannenberg, who attempts to do theology from the diamet-
rically opposite starting point, can be accused of in fact be-
ginning "i th faith because of his understanding that "historical 
inquiry abvays takes place from an already given context of 
meaning".26 It is apparent also that Butterfield is only able 
to 'discover' God's action in history by faith. As noted in 
the first chapter, we believe that Butterfield's talk of the 
third kind of analysis of the events of history is in effect a 
plea for a Christian philosophy of history, or, in other ,wrds, 
a plea for a Christian principle of interpretation. So far then 
we are in agreement with Butterfield's understanding. Tlowever, 
his method, and thus his understanding, need development and it 
is to this task that we now turn. 
Our second 'conclusion is very similar to the first in that it is 
25. Ibid., p.lOl. The question of ,,,hethcr Butterfield, with his 
emphasis on 'technical history', would agree "'ith this does 
not concern us, for we are primarily interested in this thesis 
with his 'third level of analysis'. 
26. 1{. Pannenberg, Jesus, God and Nan, p.109. 
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simply a developl!lent of it. Becrtuse God's action in history is 
discernible only ~y the eye of faith, any attempt to discern his 
action in history mUbt begin ",ith a theological inquiry rather 
than a historical one. Thus while our first conclusion is con-
cerned ",ith the possibility of det ermining God's action, our 
second conclusion is concerned with the method of doing so. We 
are not stating that God's action in history can be determined 
",ithout reference to historical inquiry, but that it ",ould be 
\,rong to start there. Also, the quality, or accuracy, of our 
findings depends upon the throughness of our theological research. 
A statement by Pannenberg may be used to introduce our argument: 27 
"Historical inquiry alvays takes place from an already Given con-
text of meaning, out of a preunderstanding of the object of in-
quiry, \yhich, ho\,ever, is modified and corrected in the process 
of research on the basis of the phenomena examined". The words 
that are particularly relevant are "out of a preunderstanding of 
the object of inQuiry".28 These words are true of every scien-
tific method,29 from the natural sciences to history and theology. 
The \,ay in \,hich this notion applies to our discussion is that 
in theology the basic source for understanding \"ho God is - and 
ho", he _ is active in history is reve lation. lio", ever, history is 
not the only veh icle of revelation. As John :-Jacquarrie puts it: 
27. Ibid. 
28. This understandinG of PannenberG's could also be used to 
arGue that in fact his the oloGY becins \dth faith. Pan-
nenberg has in mind here his notion that there is no reve-
lation in historical fact apart from the con text of tradi-
tions and interpretations in "hich it took place. The \mrds 
aTe used here as a sprinG-board for ILly discussion, i.e. I 
do not pretend to use them as Pannenberc ",ould. 
29. There is no one scil'!ntific method, but many. See Ian Barbour, 
I ssues in Science and Religion, p.lJ8. 
I 
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"It 110uld seem that almost anythinG in the 1wrld cc,n be an oc-
casion for revelation.,,30 The point is, that "'hile history is 
an important means whereby God discloses himself, and one ',hich 
is on a "more sophisticated level" than nature, to use Macquar-
riels Hords, it is not the only means 1,'hereby God discloses him-
self. Personal relationships are also important vehicles of reve-
lation, and the revelatory experience way even be "entirely inter-
iorized" so that God is encountered "in the depths of the human 
mind".3 l It is clear that there are no pure facts in history. 
And, for this reason if meaning is to be found in history, or 
if history is to reveal God's presence and action, it must be 
understood according to the content of the traditions and inter-
preta tions in ,,,hich it took plac e, as Pannenberg ,{ould have it, 
01', it must be interpreted by the eye of faith, as He ",ish to 
assert. But "hThat \\Te have discovered no"r is that Hacquarrie' s 
observation regarding the diversity of the phenomena "'hich may 
become bearers of revelato_on indicates that history alone cannot 
provide sufficient data for the determination of God's action. 
If we are to determine God's action in history we must first 
begin with theology so that when 1,'e begin our historical inquiry32 
He ,<Jill have sufficient pointers to indicate "here "e ought to 
look for God's action. This method is illustrated in Butter-
field's 1;'ork. 
30. J. Nacquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p.6. 
31. Ibid. 
32. By spe,,--1,:ing of a "historical inquiry" I do not mean the sort 
of inquiry that Butterfield unclertal~es in The Reconstruction 
of a Historical E isode : The Histor- of the Enouir' into the 
origins of the Seven Year's War for, as ve have seen, God's 
action cannot be discerned by means of such an inquiry), but 
simply the task of applying the 'findings' of the theological 
inquiry to the r human drama'. 
Perhaps the best ~llustrat~on ~s Dutterr~eld's d~scuss~on of 
cataclysm and trac~c confl~ct ~n h~story. H~s approach ~s to go 
back to the Old Testament to discover ho,·, the HebreHs dealt ,;~th 
the moral-h~stor~cal problems of the~r t~JlJes. As ,,'e not~ced ~n 
chapter three, Butterf~eld's most ~mportant po~nt ~s that "e 
should see that ~n the p~cture of the Suffer~ng Servant there ~s 
"the nearest th~ng to a clue for those ~~o ,,~sh to lnake anyth~ng 
out of the human drama."JJ H~s hope ~s that the problems of the 
present day 1V~11 be seen to be s~m~lar to those of the Hebre"s so 
that the Hebre" understand~ng may ~nd~cate ho" God ~s act~ve to-
day. It ~s clear therefore that Butterf~eld br~ngs to h~story a 
1Vealth of theoloe:~cal mean~ng ~n order to d~scern God's act~on. 
Butterf~eld' s work also ~nd~cates ho" an understand~ng of God' 5 
act~on ~s l~m~ted ~f the theolog~cal ~nqu~ry "h~ch preceeds the 
h~stor~cal one ~s inadequate. It ~s th~s that 1Ve d~scovered ~n 
the second chapter ,,'hen He not~ced that , because of h~s fa~lure 
to recogn~ze "hat, ~n follo,,'~ng Re~nhold N~ebuhr, He called the 
second s~de of the paradox of grac e, he fa~led to recogn~ze a 
,,,hole thratre of God's act~on ~n h~story. Had Butterf~eld pa~d 
more attent~on to the theolog~cal doctr~ne of salvat~on he would 
have d~scovered that God ~s at work ~n h~story creat~ng a new 
human~ty. Butterf~eld's assert~on that h~story ~nd~cates the 
s~nfulness of human nature does not rule out the poss~b~l~ty of 
God's "'ork ~n crea t ~ng a ne,,' human~ ty. It ~nd~cates rather the 
,,~sdom of Parmenberg's observat~on quoted above. The preunder-
stalId~ng of the object of ~nqll~ry ~s mod~f~ed alld corrected ~n 
JJ. H. Butterf~eld, Chr~st~all~ty and II~story, p.8S. 
i 
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the process of research on the basis of' the phenomena examined, 
says Parulenbere. In this case it means, f'or example, that our 
understanding of' justi:fication and sanctification must take 
account of the continuance of sin in the li:fe of' the believer. 
Luther's phrase simul ,jus tus et reccator II1nst surely count as 
such an attempt. Butterf'ield's ,,,ork indicates therefore that 
the quality of the theological research preceeding the historical 
inquiry determines to a large extent the success of the attempt 
to determine the a ction of' God in history. 
Langdom Gilkey has attempted to base his interpretation of his-
tory (and thus his understanding of God's action in history) on 
a sound theological footing. His attempt is to base his under-
standing on a correlative understanding of providence and escha-
tology.3 4 Christology also plays an important part in his worlc. 
He says:35 
"The principle of ~leaning in history, ••• has several 
dif'ferent but related levels: a level of creative pro-
vidence, a level of redemptive grace and a level of 
eschatological fulfilment. These 'multi-leveled' re-
demptive forces of history '''hich give meaning to his-
tory despite its ambiguity leading to destruction are 
universal. But the character and goal of all three 
levels of the divine activity in history are kno,,'l1 
most fully in Jesus, and thus the possibility of our 
certainty about them and of our invard acceptance of 
and participation in them is fullest there." 
Gilkey's emphasis on a three leveled basis :for discoverinG meaninc; 
in history is impor tant. The emphasis on christology is essen-
tial for it is in Jesus that revelation receives its clearest fo-
cus. Also, ,.,ithout providence God's action appears to have little 
34. See L. Gilkey, op. cit., chap. II. 
35. Ibid., p.284. 
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to do with the present and it is thus hard to discern his action 
vith any clarity. Without the emphasis on eschatology, on the 
other hand, the ambie-uity of the present events makes the no-
tion of providence problematic (because, as we noticed in the 
fourth chapter , the problem of suffering and evil, especially 
the suffering "'hich leads to a hardening of character because 
it is not accompanied by an understanding of the v icarious na-
ture of suffering is raised) and this in turn complicates the 
determination of God's action in history . 
lie have noticed that the tlo..roughness of the preliminary theolo-
gical inquiry dictates to a large extent our ability t o deter-
mine ",ith accuracy God's action in history. For this reason, we 
need as "ide a survey as possible, and so, ',hile Gilkey may be 
accurate in indicating the three major divisions of the theolo-
gical task (i.e. creative prov idence, redeJ:lptive grace and es-
chatological fulfilment), a fuller treatment of doctrine than 
he undertruces is necessary. Because of space ru,d the limitations 
of this thesis the task cannot, of course, be undertal~en here. 
All that "hTe may do is call fo r as "Tide a survey as possible. For 
instance, even a doctrine such as ancelology can be of assistance 
~n determining God's action, for, as Karl Barth ,{rites, " ..• God 
selects and sends His messengers, the angels, ",,'ho precede the 
reve lation and doing of His will on earth as objective and authen-
tic witnesses ••• "3 6 
The doctrine of the person and ",ork of the Holy Spirit deserves 
36. K. Ba rth, Church Do gmatics, Vol.III:3, p.369. 
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special lnention. It is a doctrine that is orten neclected in 
discussions or the meaning of history and or God's action in 
history.J7 Yet it is a doctrine "'hich ought to be given a prom-
inent place in the discussion of God's action ror, in many ,·:ays, 
the action of God can be summarized in an understanding of the 
,,'ork of the Holy Spirit. G.S. Hendry has Hritten that a "provi-
sional defi~ition" of the Holy Spirit may be: " the Holy 
Spirit means the living action of God in the "orld."J8 John V. 
Taylor has discussed the ,,'ork of the Holy Spirit in a particu-
larly illuminating way in his boolc The Go-Bet"een God. In the 
first chapter of this thesis "e noticed that it is by the inter-
pretative aspect of faith that we "see" the action of God in 
history. Taylor goes to great lengths to describe the "ork of 
the Holy Spirit as that of enabling communication and a",areness. J9 
40 He says: 
"The Holy Spirit is the invisible third party ",11.0 
stands beh{een me and the other, makinG us mutually 
a"are. Supremely and primarily he opens my eyes to 
Christ. But he also opens my eyes to the brother 
in Clu'ist, or the fel101,-man, or the point of need, 
or the heart-breaking brutality and the equally heart-
breaking beauty of the world. He is the giver of 
that vision "ithout ",hich the people perish." 
He describes the Holy Spirit as "that unceasing, dynamic comTIluni-
cator and Go-Between operating upon every element and every pro-
cess of the material universe, the immanent and anonymous pre-
41 
sence of God". 
37. For example, "Holy Spirit" is not even listed in Gilkey's 
index of subjects. Butterrield hardly ever speaks of the 
Spirit. 
38. Cit. ap. Blaikie, op. cit., p.25. 
39. See John V. Taylor, The Go-Beh,een God, chapter I, especially 
p.l7. 
40. Ibid., p.19. 
41. Ibid., .p.64. 
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In the ~ourth chapter we examined God's action in history in 
terms o~ an wlderstanding of providence which sees God as, fol-
10"inG Gill,ey, "the Ground of sel~-actualizinG ~reedom and as 
the creative source o~ new possibilities in each situation".42 
Taylor has a similar understanding of the "orle of God, "'hich, 
however, he describes in connection with the work of the Holy 
Spirit. He says: "At every point in tIle story the Creator 
Spirit p r esents the opportunity for advance by creating the oc-
casion lor choice ,,43 The importance of the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit for an understanding of God 's action is further 
illustrated by the universal scope of the Spirit 's ,,,ork. Our 
discussion so far has indicated that God is at ""ork in all the 
processes of history for he is the sovereign Lord of history. 
Taylor's observation that "many of the causes (the Holy Spirit) 
initiate s are being better served by men of other allegiances 
than by Christians" 44 relates our understanding to an under-
standing of the ,,>Ork of the Holy Spirit. 45 Taylor also says: 
" ••• it is essential for our doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit to recognize that so much can be said about 
him "'hich is universal . Just as he "orles anonymously 
through all the processes of creation, so to all men 
of all belie~s at all times he gives the unexpected 
opening of eyes, the deep awareness of that 'other' 
God or cre8.ture - the over,,'helming G"usts o:f power; 
the double vision o:f ,,,hat is and ,,'hat might be," the 
call to sacrifice, the gifts of prophecy and prayer 
and healing and ecstasy. The more we learn to recog-
nize his actions the l!lore 'fe shall find him in the 
life of the "orld every,,·here." 
Taylor does not, of course, restrict the work of the Holy Spirit 
to this 'universal' activity. Since pentecost Jesus gives the 
42. L. Gilkey, op. cit., p.264 and see thesis p.72. 
43. J.V. Taylor, op. cit., p.75. 
44. Ibid., p.103. 
45. Ibid., p.83. 
gift of the Spirit in "a 11e,,, and unique "ay" to those ',ho have 
fai th in him. 46 So, throuGh the ",orl~ of the Spirit, God is 
active1y creating the ne,,, humanity that "e discussed in our 
second chapter, for as Taylor says, "Life 'in the Spirit' is 
identical ",ith life 'in Christ,.,,47 
In conclusion, Butterfield is successful in pointing to God's 
action in history because he brings to his history his faith 
understanding. We have argued though, that his success "ould 
have been even greater had he started ",ith a thorough theolo-
gical inquiry. In any case, Butterfield's ,,'ork provides a 
valuable starting point, and points the ,,,ay :for,;ard, for a full 
understanding of God's action in history. 
46. Ibid., p. 106. 
47. Ibid., p.llO. 
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